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ANTITRUST AND THE SYSTEMIC
BIAS AGAINST SMALL BUSINESS:
KODAK, STRATEGIC CONDUCT, AND
LEVERAGE THEORY
Warren S. Grimest
INTIRODUCTION
I'll always remember the day I first read Kodak. It was late
June of 1992; a sunny, smog-free Los Angeles sky offered expansive
views. The words of Justice Harry Blackmun, too, seemed clear and
far-sighted. Yes, that's the same jurist who antitrust lawyers knew for
offering "Casey at the Bat" and other baseball lore in an eclectically
written but backwater opinion involving professional baseball's judi-
2
cially crafted antitrust exemption. But Kodak was not about baseball
trivia.
Blackmun wrote for the Court that "[llegal presumptions that
rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law."3  This straightforward en-
dorsement of empiricism in judicial interpretation was a unifying
theme for post-Chicago antitrust analysis. The Court refused to al-
low dismissal before trial of an antitrust claim backed by credible
economic theory and the plaintiffs' threshold evidence of anticom-
petitive effects.4 And there was more. The opinion showed an atten-
tion to and analysis of information problems that could be relevant to
establishing the defendant's market power in the sale of aftermarket
parts. The Court was unwilling to be constrained by rigid or artificial
market definitions, instead guiding its analysis by considering actual
t Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los
Angeles, CA.
1 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
2 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
' Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67.
4 Id. at 485-86.
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anticompetitive effects.5 The outcome was consistent with some ear-
lier cases, but Kodak offered a clarity of analysis and explanatory
power lacking in past rulings.
Later in the summer, the smog returned to Los Angeles skies.
As the first commentary on Kodak appeared, it was evident that what
for me was clarifying and enlightening was for some impenetrable,
obscuring, and perhaps even toxic to inhale. Through the ensuing
decade, Kodak has engendered strong praise6 and harsh criticism?
One key holding in Kodak, the Court's recognition of the coercive
effect of sunk investments in a seller's line, has received a frosty re-
ception in the majority of federal court decisions that have addressed
it, but it has also been expressly embraced and followed by a few
courts.
With the benefit of a decade of hindsight and ample commen-
tary, I offer a different perspective on Kodak: as a key to a compre-
hensive strategy that addresses the modern marketplace's systemic
bias against small business. Large power buyers and sellers up and
down the distribution chain are common in most markets. These
power players offset one another in buyer-seller relationships. The
countervailing power that checks many potentially abusive exercises
of market power is, however, lacking when power players compete
with, buy from, or sell to non-power players. Small businesses, then,
are opportune targets for strategic behavior that raises their costs or
5 See id. at 477 ("It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market power to raise
prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that
Kodak did so."). See also Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak
and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTrrRusT L.J. 187 (2000) (describing and explaining this
aspect of the Kodak holding). For a discussion of careful factual analysis as the hallmark of
post-Chicago economics, see generally Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics:
Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical
World, 63 ANTrrRUST L.J. 669 (1995).
6 Among the favorable commentary: Severin Borenstein et al., Antitrust Policy in After-
markets, 63 ANTrrRUST L.J. 455 (1995); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After
Kodak: A Reply to Larson's Comment, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 267 (1994); Robert H. Lande, Chi-
cago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak
World, 62 ANTrrRUST L.J. 193 (1993); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Theory and Fact in Antitrust Doc-
trine: Summary Judgment Standards, Single-Brand Aftermarkets and the Clash of Microeco-
nomic Mddels, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 887 (2000); Salop, supra note 5; Gordon B. Spivack &
Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 203 (1993).
7 Among the critical commentary: Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Com-
petition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Dennis W.
Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-Why Aspen and
Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659 (2001); George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty
or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 177 (1993); Herbert Hovenk-
amp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REv.
1447 (1993); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3
SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 43 (1993); Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making
Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (1995).
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imposes discriminatory terms on them. As actual and potential rivals
of power-wielding firms, small businesses are a vital cog in the com-
petitive mechanism.
Current antitrust interpretation and enforcement contributes to
the anti-small-business bias: (1) through relative intolerance of small
firms' collective action that can generate offsetting countervailing
power and (2) through unwarranted curtailment of antitrust claims
that provide potential remedies for power abuses that typically target
small business. Addressing this systemic bias against small business
will require a comprehensive strategy. Kodak suggests a number of
central elements to this strategy. The overarching theme is that an
antitrust analysis must be based on real market effects, not on rote
application of rules that ignore competitive realities. There are, in
addition, a number of important corollary themes from Kodak: (1) in
claims of seller power abuse, a full antitrust analysis cannot be done
while wearing blinders that screen out the impact of buyer informa-
tion inadequacies and the coercive effect of sunk investment; (2) lev-
eraging theory8 retains its validity when large power firms use tie-ins
strategically to target non-power rivals or customers; and (3) antitrust
claims backed by threshold evidence of anticompetitive effects and a
credible economic theory should survive motions for pretrial dis-
missal. These points are explored and developed below.
I. THE SYsTEMIc BIAs AGAINST SMALL BusINEss
A. Power, Countervailing Power, and Strategic Behavior in Modern
Markets
Modem markets and antitrust policy combine to create a sys-
temic bias against small business. The bias is created by the conver-
gence of three factors: (1) the presence of large power firms in most
markets; (2) the exercise of countervailing power in commercial
transactions between power firms; and (3) the power firms' strategic
exercise of power against non-power players, raising their costs or
forcing them to accept unfavorable, discriminatory terms.
1. The Nature of Large Firm Power
The large power firms in most markets lack pure monopoly
power. Although such firms may price well above marginal cost,
they lack the freedom of action of a true monopolist. These firms
tend to be oligopolists in a market that may be dominated.by two or
more firms. The size advantages that large firms enjoy are natural
8 See leverage theory discussion infra Part Ill.
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and inevitable and usually not a direct concern of competition policy.
Attaining a size sufficient to achieve minimum efficient scale, for
example, can be necessary to compete in a global market. A small
business cannot hope to operate on the scale required to design, pro-
duce and market large passenger-carrying airplanes. But along with
efficient scale, large firms often possess significant market power.
That power may be employed strategically to the detriment of non-
power players, a matter to be addressed below.
2. Power Firms and Countervailing Power
Galbraith coined the term "countervailing power" in a book writ-
ten in 1952. 9 The author viewed countervailing power as a positive
and natural response to power firms; it allowed a large buyer or seller
to negotiate competitive terms in dealing with the power firm. More
recently, Porter has written about the role of power buyers and power
sellers, suggesting that the presence of these power players is a key to
assessing the performance of a particular firm. 10
If all buyers and sellers up and down the distribution chain could
wield power, one might expect the economy to perform adequately in
some respects. Although vital dynamism in the market might be un-
dermined, the allocation of goods and services could be reasonably
efficient. Countervailing power might check power in every transac-
tion down to the ultimate sale of goods and services to consumers.
Assuming the absence of collusion, consumers too might fare well if
retailing, although oligopolistic, remained effectively competitive.
This description, however, does not comport with real markets, which
are peppered not only with large power firms, but also with small
players that are frequently the targets of strategic abuse. These small
players, entering and leaving markets with greater frequency than the
large firms, provide an essential element of dynamism to otherwise
relatively static markets.
3. The Strategic Employment of Power Against Non-Power Players
A world in which power checks power leaves little place for
those economic players that do not and cannot wield power. Non-
power players include, in addition to consumers, any player that buys
or sells in relatively small quantities. The list of such players includes
small businesses, franchisees, professionals practicing in small
9 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-
VAILING POWER (1952).
1o MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUS-
TRIES AND COMPETITORS 3-6 (1980).
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groups, non-profits, small governmental units, or even relatively large
firms that buy or sell only small amounts of a product.
Small players can be the targets of antitrust abuse not only as
purchasers from or sellers to such firms, but also as rivals of power
firms. The facts in Kodak illustrate two of these potential injuries.
The independent service providers that sought to compete against
Kodak in servicing original micrographic equipment complained that
their costs were raised (and many were driven from the market) by
Kodak's policy of denying them access to needed spare parts. Small
players as purchasers were also discriminated against because the tie-
in required them to purchase Kodak service in order to obtain Kodak
spare parts (Kodak did not enforce the tie-in against end users that
serviced their own equipment).'
Small sellers are disadvantaged relative to their larger counter-
parts because they lack the leverage to check the power of a mo-
nopsonist buyer. Although pure monopsony is rare, many power
buyers enjoy relational market power in dealing with small sellers
who have committed their business to a selling relationship with the
power buyer. Examples might be an independent contractor that
works exclusively for a large firm (such as a taxicab or truck driver
providing a vehicle and driving services under contract to a large
firm, a franchisee selling distribution and promotion services under
long term contract to a franchisor, or doctors selling their services to
an IMO).
Indeed, the system bias against small players may undercut them
even when they are not buying from or selling to power firms. For
example, a small seller may be unable to sell at the same prices that
are received by its large power-wielding rival. A monopolist usually
can effect price discrimination that targets small buyers; so too might
an oligopolist if the price discrimination scheme is followed by its
major rivals. Of course, if price discrimination is a parallel practice
in an oligopolistic industry, it can have anticompetitive effects on
non-power buyers, but there is no obvious competitive disadvantage
to the small rival seller-that rival can effect the same price discrimi-
nation under the price umbrella provided by the large oligopolist.
But when the ability to discriminate in price is based on relational
market power exercised over buyers who are locked into the seller's
line, the large seller may reap supracompetitive returns that are un-
available to a smaller rival lacking relational power over its custom-
ers.
1 See discussion infra Part II (describing the injuries to small service providers that were
Kodak rivals and to small purchasers of Kodak parts and service).
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Consider a small soft drink bottler that would market its cola soft
drink in competition with the Coca Cola or Pepsi Cola lines. Because
of their strong brand image and market share, the large soft drink
firms can demand a higher price from buyers. But there is often more
to the large firms' advantage. If a large fast food franchisor picks
Coke or Pepsi as the brand that will be carried at all of its outlets, the
favored soft drink seller may now possess market power in its deal-
ings with the franchisees. The market power is relational-arising
from the enduring economic relationship between franchisee and
franchisor and the franchisee's sunk costs that lock it into that rela-
tionship. For example, if the soft drink dispensers at each franchised
outlet are owned and serviced by the designated bottler, the bottler
may make repairs to such equipment its lowest service priority, know-
ing that franchisees are locked in and do not have the freedom to
choose a different soft drink bottler. Smaller rivals of the favored soft
drink seller are foreclosed from the franchisee trade, raising their cost
in competing. And the franchisees themselves (a large class of small
businesses) are subject to exploitation.12
B. The Central Role of Small Business in Maintaining
Competition
Small businesses are only one group among many non-power
players that can be the target of strategically employed power. Con-
sumers, non-profits, small groups of professionals, small governmen-
tal units, and even large firms with insubstantial participation in a par-
ticular market are usually non-power players. Competition policy
should be concerned about the abusive exercise of power that targets
any of these groups. Is there a basis for according special attention to
small business?
The answer is an emphatic yes. Allocative efficiency and the
avoidance of market-power based wealth transfers, primary benefits
of competition, can be achieved only if small firms are able to com-
pete in the market place on their competitive merits. Small firms,
unlike consumers, non-profits, or governmental units, are not only
buyers and sellers in transactions with power firms; they are also the
actual and potential rivals of these firms. They provide direct head-
to-head competition that can inject new ideas and new competitive
12 This point is developed in Warren S. Grimes, Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust
Claims: Relational Market Power and the Franchisor's Conflict of Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
243, 246-49 (1999).
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vigor in the system. Maintaining dynamism in our economic system
is (or ought to be) another central goal of antitrust policy.
13
Small businesses are pivotal to competition policy for another
reason: they are a natural and vital class of antitrust enforcers. As the
frequent targets of power abuses, small businesses, unlike consumers
whose injury from antitrust abuses may be too diluted to warrant a
response, have the incentive, the information, and the financial back-
ing to mount effective antitrust challenges. As theorists have long
recognized, a rival, whether small or large, has an incentive to take
legal action against any conduct that threatens its viability, even if
that conduct is procompetitive. 14 This incentive suggests the need for
careful antitrust analysis that can weed out opportunistic suits. But if
screening rules are overreaching and eliminate meritorious claims,
competition goals are not well served. Small businesses and other
small players are the first to suffer from stifled competition, and that
injury inevitably reaches consumers.
C. Could the Bias Against Small Business Promote Competition?
Competition policy should not be anti-big business. Where be-
ing large is part of the natural, competitive order and necessary to
survive in global markets, a competition policy that indiscriminately
favored small businesses would be shortsighted. To the extent that
attaining minimum efficient scale requires large size, antitrust should
generally stand clear of behavior that allows the requisite growth.
The goal of competition policy is to promote and preserve competi-
tion on its merits, ideally achieving a neutrality about firm size that is
adjusted only if firm size correlates positively or negatively with
competition goals.
Large size can lead to economies of scale, but it can also produce
market power that is abusively exercised at the expense of small busi-
ness. Is there an argument that such abuses should be tolerated in the
interest of sound competition policy? Such an argument can be
grounded in the large power-wielding firm's need for freedom of ac-
13 Of course, the case for small business could also rest on populist concerns, echoing
Judge Learned Hand's view that small businesses contribute to the democratic social fabric,
community values, and overall satisfaction. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). One could also point to small business as a primary
constituency that supported the Sherman Act and other antitrust legislation. These are concerns
that have resonated over a century of antitrust.
14 Easterbrook and Fischel were particularly critical of targets of takeover offers that
might bring suits to challenge the takeover on antitrust grounds. See Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155 (1982).
A similar view is presented in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 16.3a2, at 597-98 (2d ed. 1999). The standing require-
ments imposed on rivals in merger suits are addressed infra Part ID.2.
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tion. One might also find support for such a policy if it resulted in
lower enforcement costs or greater certainty in the law. But any such
argument, to be persuasive, must justify anticompetitive results. The
anticompetitive conduct that victimizes small business often falls
within the definition of clear-cut antitrust violations such as monopo-
lization, tie-ins, and boycotts. Unless something more than a pretex-
tual claim can be advanced for the efficiency-enhancing effects of the
conduct, and unless that procompetitive effect cannot be attained by
reasonable and less anticompetitive means, the conduct should be
prohibited.
The case for tolerating anticompetitive conduct harmful to small
business may be strongest in an area such as price discrimination. All
sellers seek the means to discriminate in price, charging those buyers
with higher limit prices a premium not demanded of buyers with
lower limit prices. Many forms of such discrimination are widely
practiced and condoned, such as restaurant discounts for seniors or
children. One might also argue that broadly limiting price discrimina-
tion could cause power buyers to lose their ability to force lower
prices. This might occur because power sellers, knowing that they are
restrained from maintaining higher prices in sales to non-power buy-
ers, would have a stronger incentive to resist the discount demands of
the power buyers. Indeed, the power sellers might even resort to car-
tel practices to maintain uniformly high prices against all types of
buyers. Consumers would end up paying higher overall prices and
the goals of competition policy would be undermined.
This description may accurately highlight a risk from curtailing
price discrimination that targets non-power wielding firms. But the
risk is easily overstated. True price discrimination is charging differ-
ent prices to two buyers when the difference is not based on the com-
petitive merits of the buyer's purchase. 15 Large volume orders often
entail efficiencies because per unit administrative and transportation
costs are less than those generated by a small order. So a price differ-
ential that reflects only these cost savings is not price discrimination
and should not be vulnerable to antitrust attack. Large buyers would
still enjoy the benefits of any efficiency linked to volume purchasing.
Any non-efficiency related price discount would constitute price
discrimination. But all such price discrimination should be vulner-
able to antitrust attack primarily when it targets non-power buyers
and when it is reachable through traditional antitrust claims. Strategic
conduct attacking small players might be attacked in Sherman Act
15 I attempt no analysis here of the extent to which the Robinson Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1994), is consistent with the goal of prohibiting only price differentials that constitute true
price discrimination.
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section 1 claims such as tie-ins, exclusive dealing, and vertical maxi-
mum price-fixing, and related Sherman Act section 2 offenses. Even
true price discrimination might be tolerated if it were unlikely to pro-
duce anticompetitive results.
There is, in any event, a more fundamental difficulty in the logic
of any argument that price discrimination that targets non-power
firms has substantial competitive benefits. The argument leads inexo-
rably to the conclusion that small firms are needed as punching bags
for power buyers or sellers so that society can enjoy the maximum
benefits of competition. Yet, the very act of tolerating strategic pre-
dation or discrimination makes it more difficult for these non-power
firms to survive.
D. Current Competition Policy Reinforces the Systemic Bias Against
Small Business
Lacking the countervailing power to deal on equal terms with
power buyers or sellers, small players still have several options for
addressing the power disparity: (1) they can consolidate with one an-
other or sell out to a larger rival, abandoning the ranks of small busi-
ness, but attaining through business marriage the desired countervail-
ing power; (2) they can form collective buyers' or sellers' associa-
tions that will exercise countervailing power; or (3) they can seek an-
titrust remedies for abusive conduct of power buyers or sellers. Cur-
rent U.S. antitrust law gives small business substantial latitude in ar-
ranging a merger or acquisition. For some small businesses or pro-
fessionals, however, consolidation is unworkable or unpalatable, so
only the second and third options remain.
1. Antitrust's Relative Intolerance of Cooperative Buying and Selling
The antitrust laws have allowed small firms some latitude in en-
gaging in collective action to create countervailing power. A critical
limit to antitrust's tolerance of such conduct has been the per se rule
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has held that
individually powerless criminal lawyers violated the per se rule when
they formed a collective to pressure (through a boycott) the District of
Columbia on the rates and terms of representing indigent defen-
dants.16 The Court has also held that small grocery stores that formed
an association to purchase and promote a house brand of grocery
products violated the per se rule when they divided retail territories
among their members. 17 The law may be more tolerant of buyers co-
16 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
17 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
operatives than sellers cooperatives.18 The law also tolerates coopera-
tive buying and selling more readily when accompanied by efficien-
cies, but the Joint Collaboration Guidelines issued by the federal
agencies in 2000 provide that collective action that is unaccompanied
by efficiencies will still be subject to the per se rule.19 This places
small firms at an unwarranted competitive disadvantage. As ex-
plained elsewhere,20 antitrust law should adjust to permit small play-
ers (professionals practicing in small groups and small businesses) to
engage in collective action designed to generate countervailing
power, even when there are no evident efficiencies associated with
the conduct, as long as the market share of the collective does not ex-
ceed the limits permitted under current merger enforcement policy.
2. Well-Intentioned Rules That Bar Meritorious Claims
A legal system operating under the rule of stare decisis tends to
resist sudden changes in direction. Because the Sherman Act is writ-
ten in general language comparable to provisions of the U.S. Consti-
tution, judicial interpretations are pivotal in shaping antitrust law and
policy. One of the defining characteristics of antitrust judicial inter-
pretations may be that any doctrinal development, however soundly
based in empirically determined realities, becomes deductive in its
application. It is not unusual for a new development to be followed by
a period of rote application to a widening universe of fact patterns.
Such a course easily leads to extending a doctrine beyond its empiri-
cal roots.
Populist doctrines of the 1960s, such as the goal of protecting
small business and of forestalling in their incipiency any trend toward
market concentration,21 were perceived as producing rote and exces-
sive application of antitrust law. By the 1970s, many in the antitrust
community were persuaded that overreaching enforcement was un-
18 See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that a sellers'
boycott was per se unlawful); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Print-
ing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that the decision of a buyers' cooperative to exclude a
member was not a per se unlawful boycott). See the discussion of these cases in Warren S.
Grimes, The Sherman Act's Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players' Collective
Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 217-25 (2001).
19 FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORA-
TIONs AMONG COMPETITORS §§ 3.2,4.2 (2000).
20 See Grimes, supra note 18, at 248 (urging that the Collaboration Guidelines be
amended to allow small players greater latitude to use collective action to create countervailing
power).
21 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322, 344 (1962) (citing as goals of
amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act the protection of small business and the prevention
in their incipiency of trends toward concentration).
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dermining the goals of competition. 22 The courts responded by em-
bracing doctrines and rules that limited access to the courts and made
it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove a violation. Most (perhaps all)
of these rules had an empirical basis: they grew out of genuine per-
ceptions that some enforcement initiatives were stiffing competition
or were generating costs that outweighed any competitive benefit.
Over the past 30 years, traditional antitrust remedies for power
abuses have been significantly curtailed. Rules of interpretation, de-
signed with the commendable intent of screening out non-meritorious
claims, have often been applied mechanically or blindly, just as popu-
list doctrines were in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, power players
are invited to structure anticompetitive conduct in a manner that insu-
lates it from antitrust attack. A de facto per se legality may attach to
even blatantly anticompetitive conduct. Examples include the limit-
ing of antitrust claims for (1) predatory pricing; (2) minimum vertical
price-fixing and related retail power abuses; (3) seller power abuses
such as tie-ins, exclusive dealing and vertical maximum price-fixing;
and (4) Sherman Act section 2 abuses that target small rivals or small
upstream or downstream players. In addition, small firms that would
sue now confront stiffer standards for establishing antitrust injury and
for surviving pre-trial motions for summary disposition.
This list, by no means exhaustive, is illustrative of screening de-
vices that have evolved during the last three decades. There will be
disagreement about the wisdom and extent of each individual curtail-
ment. Most evolved as a response to perceived overreaching antitrust
enforcement. However sound a doctrine's evolution, if the reaction to
excessive enforcement is itself overreaching, small business will im-
mediately experience perverse effects. Each of the power abuses
identified above frequently target small businesses and some, such as
strategic predatory conduct, exclusively attack small or less powerful
rivals.
(a) Predatory Pricing
The shift in Supreme Court treatment of predatory pricing is cap-
tured in two cases: Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.23 in 1967
and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.24 in
1993. Here, as in other areas, the trend toward more onerous stan-
dards for a plaintiff may be defended as a response to overreaching
2 See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (writing that the "sole consistency" to be found in the Court's merger jurisprudence
was that "the Government always wins").
23 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
24 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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enforcement in the populist era.25 A competitor that lowers its price
is engaging in a fundamental act of competition that benefits consum-
ers. But where the price cutting is strategic and targeted to a small
rival, the Court's jurisprudence should recognize the legitimacy of a
predatory pricing claim brought to protect and preserve the small
firm's right to do business free of targeted predation by a power ri-
val. 6 A recent district court ruling involving mechanical application
of the Supreme Court's screening tests for below cost pricing and re-
coupment (and dismissal of a claim that strategic conduct was em-
ployed to eliminate small rivals) is United States v. AMR Corp.27
(b) Vertical Maximum Price-Fixing and Related Power Buyer Abuses
Vertical minimum price-fixing and related retail power abuses
often target smaller retailers, or even relatively large retailers, that
offer discount terms to consumers but have insufficient leverage with
their suppliers to counteract the power of a larger retail buyer.28 In
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics,29 a small retailer was
terminated as a Sharp dealer because a larger rival retailer did not
want the competition from the small retailer. A large buyer's lever-
age may also be exercised to force the manufacturer to fix the mini-
mum retail price for the product in question. Although Supreme
Court decisions have maintained the per se rule against vertical
minimum price-fixing, cases such as Business Electronics and Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.30 have considerably narrowed
the area in which the per se rule is applied. If the law has made it eas-
ier to squelch a small discounting retailer, price competition from new
and efficient retailers is made more difficult, and competition and
consumers are the worse for the loss of these small players' ability to
compete vigorously by lowering their prices.
' The movement for stiffer standards governing predatory pricing gained momentum
with the Areeda and Turner article proposing a price-based (average variable cost) screening
standard for all predatory pricing claims. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697
(1975).
26 For an overview of how strategic price predation may occur, see Jonathan B. Baker,
Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTrrRUST L.J. 585
(1994).
27 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), appeal docketed (10th Cir. 2001). This decision
is addressed infra Part V.A.
2 In Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), the victims of the large
retailer's power were large warehouse clubs such as Price/Costco and Sam's Club.
29 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
'0 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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(c) Tie-ins and Related Power Seller Abuses
Seller power may target small business through distribution prac-
tices such as tie-ins, forced exclusive dealing, or vertical maximum
price-fixing. What each of these abuses has in common is the pres-
ence of a power seller that can coerce small buyers and, because the
market power underlying each of these abuses is often relational, a
relevance to the lock-in and informational issues raised in Kodak.
During the 1960s, there were three Supreme Court tie-in deci-
sions favorable to the plaintiff in cases involving relational market
power.31  After the 1960s, these tie-in cases disappeared from the
Court's docket, until Kodak During this same period, various screen-
ing rules that constrain tie-in claims have found their way into the
fabric of the law. An example of such a rule is the requirement rec-
ognized in some circuits that the defendant be shown to have an eco-
nomic interest in the tied product.32 The premise of this rule is that if
the defendant has no economic interest in the sale of the tied product,
then imposition of the tie is unlikely to have been driven by anticom-
petitive intent. A tying seller that itself does not benefit from the tie
is likely to have sought benign or procompetitive goals in imposing
the tie.
Because marketplace behavior is driven by the desire to make
money, the premise that a seller would impose a tie on customers en-
tirely free of any profit incentive is open to question. Whether im-
posed for procompetitive or anticompetitive reasons, a tie will likely
make money for the tying seller. For example, if the tie is imposed
because, by limiting the source of the tied product, the seller can en-
sure that the tying product performs well, then there is a goodwill
gain for the tying seller in imposing the tie. Most sellers would not
impose a tie-in without any financial incentive.33
31 See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (upholding an order enjoining Texaco
from requiring franchisee to purchase its products); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (upholding plaintiff dealers' tying claim against manufacturer);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (upholding plaintiff franchisees' tying claim
against oil company). In these franchising cases, the Court did not use the term "relational
market power," but described facts that illustrated the franchisor's market power in dealing with
franchisees.
32 See Eric D. Young, Note, The Economic Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of
Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353 (1990) (describing and
criticizing this screening rule). See also Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Ko-
dak. Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTTrRusT LJ. 263, 317-18 (1994).
33 A seller's financial incentive may, however, be indirect and diluted. For example, law
schools may impose certain threshold requirements (a college degree or a minimum score on an
entry examination) for entering students that might be characterized as tie-ins. The school re-
ceives only indirect financial reward for the imposition of these requirements.
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Even accepting the premise of the economic interest rule, the
courts have, in some instances, overextended its reach. In Directory
Sales Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.,34 the court held
that no tie-in could be shown because the tying product (telephone
service) and tied product (yellow pages listing) were sold by separate
subsidiaries of the parent corporation.35 In the court's view, the plain-
tiff had failed to trace the flow of funds to establish how the tying
seller benefited from sale of the tied product.36 The notion that a par-
ent and subsidiary do not share a common economic interest must
come as something of a shock to business owners and investors. It
also seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that,
when it comes to showing a conspiracy, a parent and wholly-owned
subsidiary must be considered a single entity.37 The holding, then,
illustrates the maxim that valid rules overextended are bad law.
Non-power firms have experienced similar escalations in the
requirements for prevailing in exclusive dealing and vertical maxi-
mum price-fixing claims. The Court decided Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co. 38 in 1961, but has not revisited the area (except for
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde39). Meanwhile, lower court decisions have
probably materially narrowed the law in this area.40  After deciding
Albrecht v. Herald Co.4 1 in 1968, the Court did not revisit the merits
of vertical maximum price-fixing again until it decided State Oil Co.
v. Khan42 in 1997, at which point it discarded the per se rule against
this form of price-fixing. Some of this retrenchment in the law gov-
ering seller power abuses was warranted, but current case law has
unduly handicapped small firms in pressing meritorious claims. For
'4 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
"s Id. at 611.
36 See id. In another case in which the economic interest standard was applied beyond its
rationale, the court refused to acknowledge a common economic interest between a manufac-
turer that imposed a tie on aftermarket parts and service and the firm's dealers that provided the
parts and service. See Mitel Corp. v. A & A Connections Inc., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,120 (E. D. Pa. 1998). The notion that a supplier has no economic interest in keeping its
dealers happy is counterintuitive and contrary to the Supreme Court's well-founded recognition
that a whole range of vertical restraints are imposed by suppliers to keep dealers content and
motivated to actively promote the supplier's products. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
37 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984)
("[The parent may assert full control at any molient if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's
best interests.").
3' 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
'9 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
40 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 7.3d, at 336-39 (2000) (citing relevant cases).
4' 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
42 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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example, in Khan the Court abandoned the per se rule without any
apparent recognition that vertical maximum price-fixing, just as a tie-
in or forced exclusive dealing, can be an abusive exercise of a seller's
power over a relatively powerless buyer.
43
(d) Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization
The Court's contemporary section 2 jurisprudence includes As-
pen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,44 a case that can be
explained by the plaintiff's sunk investment in reliance on an efficient
cooperative practice of issuing an all-area lift ticket. The case is a
powerful post-Chicago precedent that relies on a factual inquiry into
actual anticompetitive consequences to a smaller rival firm. The
plaintiffs' victory in Kodak may be described in similar terms. But so
far, neither Aspen nor Kodak has produced widespread recognition of
the vulnerability of small firms to strategic market power abuses.
A case that illustrates this vulnerability (decided after Aspen but
before Kodak) is Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.45 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that United Air-
lines and American Airlines had not violated section 2 through their
control of computer reservations systems ("CRS") used by travel
agents to book airline flights. In order to be listed on the defendants'
systems, the plaintiffs (four smaller airlines) had to pay high fees and
endure discriminatory listings. The defendants' flights were always
listed before any rival's flights, even if a rival's flight more closely
matched the time at which the customer wished to fly. If the rival
airline refused to pay the access fee, it would lose access to thirty to
forty percent of all travel agents (who used only the United or Ameri-
can CRS).46
In the face of evidence that the defendants possessed the power
to impose supracompetitive terms for listings on their systems, the
court nonetheless ruled for the defendants because the plaintiffs had
not established monopolization, or a threat of monopolization, in the
air travel market. 47 This showing, the court reasoned, was required to
43 The Court's insensitivity to targeted abuse of small retailers may be traced in part to the
imbalanced discussion of vertical maximum price-fixing in the amicus brief filed by the De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. See Warren S. Grimes, Making Sense of
State Oil Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule of Reason, 66 ANTrrRUST
LJ. 567,574 (1998).
44 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
45 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 These facts were found by the district court in In re Air Passenger Computer Reserva-
tions Systems Antitrust Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1449-50 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
47 See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 545.
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establish a leveraging abuse of monopoly power. The holding is re-
sponsive to criticism of leveraging theory that has received support
from some theorists, a point that is developed infra in Part II. But
the ruling is revisionist and inconsistent with Supreme Court language
in cases such as United States v. Griffith.48 It would erect yet another
obstacle in the path of smaller rivals that seek relief from strategic
conduct that raises their costs in competing.
(e) Limiting Access to the Courts
At a point in time when private antitrust suits peaked (in 1977),
the Supreme Court decided Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc. ,49 a case which is the genesis of the antitrust injury doctrine. The
injury that the plaintiff complains of, the Court explained, must be of
a type that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.50 If the injury
was simply the result of healthy competition, as the Court concluded
was the case with the Pueblo plaintiff, there should be no antitrust
relief. But here, again, a sound doctrine overextended is bad law. In
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,51 the Court extended the
antitrust injury doctrine to prevent a smaller rival from obtaining in-
junctive relief to halt the merger of the second and third largest meat
packing firms in the industry. The Court ordered dismissal of the
case notwithstanding lower court holdings that the plaintiff met its
burden of establishing that the acquisition would likely violate section
7 of the Clayton Act.52 As a rival, the Court concluded, the plaintiff
could benefit from the pricing umbrella established if the merged firm
became the price leader in an oligopolistic industry. Hence, the most
likely injury that the plaintiff could sustain as the result of the merger
was if the merged firm were more efficient and could lower prices.
This injury would be due to competition, not anticompetitive con-
duct.5
3
Read broadly, the decision is troubling because it limits the most
knowledgeable and motivated class of plaintiffs, smaller rivals of the
combining firms, in mounting even the soundest of antitrust chal-
lenges to the merger.54 In many instances, it is likely that this class of
,8 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
49 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
50 See id. at 489.
-I 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
52 See id. at 107-08.
53 See id. at 117 ("[The threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition follow-
ing a merger does not constitute a threat of antitrust injury.").
54 For a discussion of the Cargill holding, see Joseph Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Pri-
vate Merger Cases Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MIcH. L.
246 [Vol. 52:231
2001] KODAK, STRATEGIC CONDUCT, AND LEVERAGE THEORY 24/
plaintiffs will be threatened with anticompetitive injury because of the
power players' ability to engage in strategic conduct. For example,
even a strong price leader in an oligopolistic industry may occasion-
ally have to resort to targeted price predation in order to maintain the
oligopolistic price umbrella. Small firms that might cut their prices to
win market share are now particularly vulnerable to this strategic pre-
dation exercised by the combined firm.
55
Another procedural obstacle for small business plaintiffs was
erected when the Supreme Court decided Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.56 In this massive proceeding in-
volving conspiracy claims against Japanese producers of television
sets intended for the U.S. market, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for the defendants
that had been granted by the district court. In key language, Justice
Powell wrote that "if the factual context renders respondents' claims
implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic
sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evi-
dence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."
57
Matsushita was read by some as establishing a generous standard for
granting summary judgment for defendants, and perhaps as an en-
dorsement of a defendant-friendly Chicago School approach to eco-
nomic analysis.
The Kodak Court discouraged any such reading of Matsushita,
rejecting arguments that Kodak's small market share in the original
equipment market a priori precluded any antitrust claims. Matsushita
meant only that if "the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no
reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should
be granted., 58 This language suggests that no particular school of
economic thought should be given precedence. But the issue has not
come fully to rest. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp.,59 a divided Court once again gave credence to a dis-
puted economic theory in granting summary judgment for the defen-
dants in predatory pricing claims. However, the Brooke Group Court
rested, some would say disingenuously, on the failings of the plain-
REV. 1, 4 (1994). For a discussion of antitrust standing, see Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth As-
sault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 437 (2001).
55 See Baker, supra note 26, at 590-91 (describing how a large firm may, through
selective predation targeting small rivals, gain a reputation as a predator that enables it to
enforce high prices at relatively low cost to it).
5 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
57 Id. at 587.
5S Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,468-69 (1992).
s9 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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tiff's factual support, not on the unacceptability of its economic the-
ory.
60
Kodak may have restored some balance to the law governing
summary judgment in antitrust claims, but other procedural obstacles
(including antitrust injury) remain as major obstacles in some suits
brought by small business rivals.
3. Kodak and Competition Policy
As it should be, the curtailment of antitrust remedies for power
abuses identified above is the subject of ongoing discourse. The out-
come of this dialogue and its impact on future antitrust policy remain
uncertain. That outcome will likely vary depending on the particular
power abuse at issue. There is, however, an overarching and straight-
forward rule that ought to guide the doctrinal discussion in each of
these areas: whether the exercise of power produces anticompetitive
results. That is the fundamental message underlying Kodak's insis-
tence that "actual market realities" instead of "legal presumptions that
rest on formalistic distinctions" guide antitrust analysis. The princi-
ple that antitrust analysis should be guided by evidence of actual anti-
competitive effects has been traced to Judge Taft's 1898 opinion in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.61 This proposition may
seem self-evident, yet it is commonly ignored, as, for example, when
a court disregards evidence of substantial anticompetitive effects and
dismisses an antitrust claim because of a mechanical rule, whether
that rule be a contrived and rigid market definition or an unyielding
requirement that no above-marginal-cost pricing can ever be preda-
tory.
62
There is, however, a narrower but nonetheless vital aspect to Ko-
dak that also speaks to the systemic bias against small business. Ko-
dak's tie-in of service and parts is an example of a power seller's stra-
tegic behavior that can raise rivals' costs and target non-power buyers
with unfavorable and discriminatory terms. The theory underlying
Kodak speaks not only to tie-ins, but also to other seller power abuses
such as forced exclusive dealing and vertical maximum price-fixing.
The next section addresses this aspect of Kodak.
(o For another perspective on the interaction of Kodak and Brooke Group, see Peritz,
supra note 6, at 896 n.19 (discussing how market realities and record facts take precedence over
economic theory in determining liability).
6' 85 F. 271, 292 (6th Cir. 1898). Salop attributes this insight to Alfred Kahn's careful
reading of Judge Taft's opinion. See Salop, supra note 5, at 200 n.38.
62 See Salop, supra note 5, at 194-201 (listing commonly occurring "traps" that cause
courts to ignore evidence of actual anticompetitive effects).
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II. THE KODAK STORY
A. Kodak's Relational Market Power- Sunk Costs and Information
Asymmetries
Kodak is about strategic behavior that targets small business in
two ways. Kodak's tie-in of aftermarket parts and service: (1) was
crafted to raise the costs of, or eliminate, its small business rivals in
the service market and (2) allowed Kodak to charge discriminatory
high prices for aftermarket parts and service to non-power buyers.
Kodak possessed relational market power, the power that arises when
enduring commercial relationships and sunk costs combine to give
one party, often the seller, control over price, quality and output in
dealings with a non-power possessing party. Kodak enjoyed this rela-
tional market power because of what is known as installed-base op-
portunism. Buyers of its micrographic equipment would have a sunk
investment in its line of equipment, a non-recoverable or, in the Su-
preme Court's jargon, a switching cost incurred in giving up the Ko-
dak line in favor of a rival's equipment.63 This cost might be related
to the depressed resale value of used Kodak equipment, the transac-
tion costs involved in researching, negotiating, and implementing the
purchase of a rival's line, or the time and investment in retraining
employees to use the rival's products. Aside from any economic loss,
there might also be a psychological constraint involved in switching
equipment, particularly if this involved selling a machine that still has
a substantial useful life. For managers of small firms that buy micro-
graphic equipment infrequently, the instinctive reaction might be to
keep the equipment until its useful life is over. The result of these
sunk costs and psychological barriers to switching would be what the
Supreme Court described as a lock-in. Buyers would be locked into
Kodak's micrographic line and would be vulnerable to high prices for
complementary products or aftermarket parts controlled by Kodak? 4
Installed-base opportunism is of course related to informational
problems. The seller's power is limited if the buyer, at the point of
purchasing original equipment, can easily and accurately compare life
cycle costs for rival offerings. The Supreme Court described the dif-
ficulties in engaging in accurate life cycle pricing.65 The buyer can-
not know at the time of purchasing original equipment the frequency
and severity of breakdowns or the cost of purchasing aftermarket
63 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476-77.
The Kodak case was focused on anticompetitive prices for the sale of aftermarket parts
and service. There is no indication in the record that plaintiffs pressed any claims involving
complementary parts used with Kodak equipment.
See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-75.
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parts or service. Parts suppliers and servicing firms may enter or
leave the market during the life cycle of the equipment, so accurately
predicting future market options for servicing will be impossible. If
the original equipment buyer is told in advance that parts availability
will be tied to the purchase of service from the manufacturer, the
buyer will still have difficulty evaluating the value of the parts and
service that will be received. Although the manufacturer's reputation
may guide the buyer,66 the quality and cost of the manufacturer's ser-
vice may vary over the product's life cycle. The equipment buyer's
difficulty in computing a life cycle price in combination with the sub-
stantial switching costs associated with abandoning an installed-base
product leave the buyer vulnerable to opportunistic pricing for after-
market parts that are manufactured or controlled by the seller.
The seller would have market power in the sale of aftermarket
parts without imposing a tie-in. This power could be exercised, for
example, by increasing price or by decreasing quality of aftermarket
parts. As long as the seller controls access to critical parts, the seller
can insist on high prices. If so, use of a tie that required a buyer of
aftermarket parts to also purchase aftermarket service would be un-
necessary to exploit the seller's market power. If the tie-in has addi-
tional anticompetitive effects, they still must be explained.
B. The Kodak Tie-In as Strategic Behavior to Exclude Rivals and
Effect Price Discrimination
Much of the commentary on Kodak has focused on the informa-
tional problems (life cycle pricing) and sunk costs (lock-in) that are
integral to the Kodak story. Harmful tie-ins are usually related to in-
formational problems.67 In contrast to bundling that may simplify a
buyer's purchasing, all tie-ins complicate the buyer's desired transac-
tion. Those tie-ins that most complicate buyers' decisions more
acutely raise information problems. The bulk of the tie-ins that the
Supreme Court has viewed skeptically over the past century have in-
volved deferred purchases of the tied product, a circumstance that
necessarily complicates the buying decision.68 Conversely, the Court
66 The value of the manufacturer's reputation as a guide to the buyer can be limited if, for
example, all major manufacturers of original equipment have established high prices for after-
market parts and service, leaving the buyer with no clear competitive options in reducing those
costs. ,
67 See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 671-79 (1982) (discussing issues of fraud or surprise
where the seller knowingly conceals the existence of the tying requirement); SULLIVAN &
GRIMES, supra note 40, §§ 7.2, at 387-88, 7.23, at 405-06 (noting that informational deficien-
cies are a significant factor in determining a tie's anticompetitiveness).
68 See Kodak, 504 U.S. 451 (1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(land lease and sale contracts with a preferential routing clause requiring plaintiffs to purchase
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has been somewhat more tolerant of tie-ins in which no deferred pur-
chase is involved-the purchaser simultaneously purchases the tying
and tied product. 69 How do these informational concerns apply to the
parts-service tie-in at issue in Kodak?
The use of a tie-in on aftermarket parts and service was in itself
not a deferred purchase tie-in-the parts and services were purchased
simultaneously. But the purchase of both parts and service was de-
ferred, sometimes long after the installed-base product was pur-
chased. So informational issues are evident.
In defense of its behavior, Kodak urged that powerful and
knowledgeable buyers were in a position to punish it if it charged su-
pracompetitive prices for its aftermarket parts. Who were these
power buyers and how could they control Kodak's pricing of after-
market parts? Any purchaser of multiple units of Kodak's equipment
would quickly learn a great deal about life cycle costs of maintaining
this machinery. But these purchasers, individually and collectively,
possessed power along with knowledge. They had the ability and the
incentive to change their supplier of original equipment if life cycle
costs were out of line and, in doing so, deprive Kodak of substantial
market share, perhaps driving production and marketing below mini-
mum efficient scale and, ultimately, pushing Kodak out of the micro-
graphic equipment business. In the face of this substantial threat, Ko-
dak singled out large buyers for favorable treatment.
Kodak apparently offered these power buyers attractive prices on
aftermarket parts and the original Kodak equipment. 70 But Kodak
wanted to preserve as much of its market power over the sale of af-
termarket parts as possible. How could it do this? The obvious an-
swer is to discriminate against non-power buyers and charge them a
significantly higher price for aftermarket parts. But such discrimina-
future rail transport service from defendants); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (salt refining equipment lease tied to future purchase of defendant's salt); IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (tabulating equipment lease tied to future purchase of defen-
dant's punch-cards).
S9 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (credit fi-
nancing tied to the simultaneous promise to purchase prefabricated house); Times Picayune Pub.
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (advertisers required to buy space in both morning
and evening editions). Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), also
involved a simultaneous purchase, and, although that case did involve substantial information
issues, was also found outside federal antitrust proscription. Of course, some non-deferred tie-
ins have been held to be unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
Loetv's is a controversial but defensible holding. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 40, § 7.2
at 421-424 (describing cases involving a non-deferred tied product).
70 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457 (stating that Kodak "charges, through negotiations and
bidding, different prices for equipment, service, and parts for different customers"). Later, the
Court stated: "Kodak's own evidence confirms that it varies the package price of equip-
ment/parts/service for different customers." Il at 477.
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tion might be undercut by arbitrage in the parts market. Large buyers
might overbuy and sell their excess inventory of parts to service pro-
viders such as the plaintiffs, making it more difficult for Kodak to
maintain its price discrimination scheme. Such arbitrage was likely if
Kodak placed no restrictions on the sale of aftermarket parts and if
the discrepancies in the prices it charged various buyers were large.
Kodak may have been more acutely concerned about its dwin-
dling market share in providing service for its own line of equipment.
Independent service providers, as long as they had ready access to
Kodak parts, might service owners' equipment on terms superior to
those that Kodak offered. Even if the independents had to pay high
prices for Kodak parts, they might still undercut Kodak's combined
price for service and parts.
Thus, the tie-in, along with Kodak's discriminatory exception
that permitted continued sale of aftermarket parts to equipment own-
ers who serviced their own equipment, allowed Kodak to target small
buyers with discriminatory prices in two ways: (1) by lessening the
risk of arbitrage in aftermarket parts sales and (2) by eliminating (or
raising the costs of) independent service providers.71  Using the tie-
in, Kodak could now exercise its installed-base market power against
small purchasers in a variety of ways: (1) by charging high prices on
parts; (2) by charging high prices on service; (3) by lowering the
quality of parts or service; or (4) by some combination of these ac-
tions. That Kodak did at least some of these things is consistent with
evidence offered by the independent service providers that their ser-
vice was preferred by some customers for its quality and cost compo-
nents.72
The story of Kodak's conduct offered here is for the most part
told in the Court's description of the plaintiffs theory of the case.
What the Court failed to provide is a comprehensive picture of the
tying seller's efforts to employ its market power strategically. With-
out the tie, Kodak could not have fully exploited its installed-base
market power against non-power buyers. And without the tie, Kodak
could not stifle competition from the small firms that were Kodak's
direct rivals in providing service. A primary competitive benefit of
countervailing power-that it can force power sellers to lower their
71 For a discussion of the use of market power to raise rivals costs, see Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). In theory, the Kodak restriction allowed both
large and small owners to purchase parts as long as they did their own servicing. But owners of
only a few Kodak machines were unlikely to do their own servicing, so the policy favored large
owners of multiple Kodak units.
72 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 465.
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prices to more competitive levels for all customers-was blocked
through a price discrimination scheme implemented by the tie-in.
III. KODAK AND THE BOWMAN CRITIQUE OF LEVERAGE THEORY
Under traditional leverage theory, a monopolist or powerful ty-
ing seller was thought capable of using its power in one product mar-
ket as a lever to extend power into complementary or related product
markets. The theory postulated that the seller was in a position to
increase anticompetitive gains beyond those that would be available if
the seller operated only in its original market. In the tie-in context,
the seller was able to extend its anticompetitive gains from the tying
product market into the tied product market. A primary anticompeti-
tive effect from leveraging was thought to be the foreclosure effect on
rivals in the leveraged or tied product market.
In 1957, Bowman published an influential article challenging
traditional leverage theory.73 Bowman argued that most tying sellers
could not increase overall return by leveraging. The tying seller
could exploit its power in the tying product market without leverag-
ing, or it could transfer some of its power into the tied product mar-
ket, but it could not increase overall return through use of the tie.
This was so because an informed buyer would calculate its limit price
for the tying product, and would further determine the competitive
price for the tied product, and would not pay more than the sum of the
two prices. A simple example based on one used by the Supreme
Court is a seller with market power in the flour market and no market
power in the sugar market.74 The seller requires the buyer to purchase
together a package of flour and a package of sugar. Can the seller
increase its supracompetitive return above the level that could be ex-
tracted if the flour and sugar were sold separately? The answer,
probably, is no. If the consumer wants to buy only flour, the addi-
tional charge for the sugar may deter the buyer from buying the flour
at all. Even if the buyer wants to buy both sugar and flour, the tying
seller may not succeed in raising its return through use of the tie. The
bundled sale price will be the sum of the buyer's limit price for flour
and the competitive price for sugar. Because consumers can readily
calculate the combined price, any price above that level will result in
decreased sales that reduce seller profits.
Of course, the tie makes the consumer's comparison shopping
more complex. A careless or inattentive consumer may fail to make
73 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19
(1957).
74 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958).
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these simple but necessary calculations and pay too much for the
bundled flour and sugar. But Bowman's analysis could still work if a
significant body of informed consumers refused to pay a surcharge
for the bundled items. As long as the seller cannot discriminate in the
price charged to various types of consumers, the ignorant or careless
consumer would gain from the price discipline imposed by the in-
formed consumer. The tying seller would have little or nothing to
gain through the tied sale of flour and sugar.
The Bowman critique of traditional leverage theory, initially
embraced by Chicago theorists, continues to find favor among some
commentators. 75 In the tie-in context, this critique attracted the votes
of four concurring Justices in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2
v. Hyde.76 The critique is elegant, logical, and persuasive under its
operative assumptions and has forced a healthy reexamination of lev-
erage theory. But the Bowman analysis remains vulnerable. 77 Its va-
lidity can extend only as far as the soundness of its underlying as-
sumptions. Two key assumptions are: (1) that the seller has substan-
tial market power in the tying product that can be exercised without
the tie-in and (2) that the market for the tied product remains effec-
tively competitive after imposition of the tie (and in this way provides
the buyer a competitive benchmark against which to measure the
value of the seller's bundled products). If both of these assumptions
hold, the tying seller could not enhance market power profits by lev-
eraging into the tied product market. Instead, there would be a zero
sum game in which profits are shifted back and forth between the ty-
ing and tied products, with no net gain to the seller. If one or both of
the pivotal premises is lacking, the Bowman critique is flawed and
traditional leverage theory may provide a more accurate description
of the competitive effects of the tie-in.
A. The Premise That Tying Sellers Have Exercisable Market
Power in the Tying Product
In most tie-in cases, the seller has substantial market power in
the tying product, but it falls short of a textbook monopoly that allows
full exploitation of monopoly profits. Kodak, for example, had sub-
75 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, § 7.9, at 317-18 (describing leveraging as "a
dubious theory whose main effect had been to preserve the Sherman Act as a small business
protection statute").
76 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, after restating
Bowman's critique of leveraging, concluded that "[t]ying may be economically harmful primar-
ily in the rare cases where power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional
market power in the market for the tied product." Il (footnote omitted).
7n A forceful critique of the Bowman thesis was offered in Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515 (1985).
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stantial power in the tying product market (aftermarket parts). Kodak
probably had tight control only over those parts that were unique to
the Kodak line, some of which were patented. Even if these parts
were twenty percent or fewer of the parts needed to service a Kodak
machine, an independent service provider could not effectively com-
pete in servicing Kodak machines without access to these parts.7' But
tight control over these brand-specific parts might still confer insuffi-
cient power to impose supracompetitive prices on power buyers that
possessed countervailing power. Without. a workable price discrimi-
nation scheme, Kodak's power to raise prices on aftermarket parts
could have been held in check by these power buyers.
By implementing the tie on aftermarket parts and service, and
excluding from this tie only those (usually large) buyers who serviced
their own equipment, Kodak should be able to implement a price dis-
crimination scheme and limit arbitrage sales of parts. Kodak should
also be able to eliminate or severely handicap independent service
organizations that might discipline service prices. In this way, Kodak
could reap supracompetitive gains against non-power buyers that
were unattainable without the use of the tie-in. The essential premise
of leveraging theory is thus vindicated, and the Bowman critique does
not apply.
A critical question is whether Kodak's ability to expand anti-
competitive gain through a tie-in would be, as Justice O'Connor sug-
gested in Jefferson Parish, a rare event. If so, Bowman's thesis might
describe the bulk of the cases in which a tie-in is challenged. But
many of the underlying market conditions confronted by Kodak are
anything but rare. Large and powerful buyers are ubiquitous in mod-
em markets for products and services. That such powerful buyers
will possess countervailing power that constrains even powerful sell-
ers is also widely acknowledged. Porter's paradigm for measuring
firm performance requires, for example, that the analyst measure
whether the firm is constrained by power buyers or power sellers.79
7s A market definition that includes all aftermarket parts for Kodak machines has been
criticized as illogical because the aftermarket parts did not compete against one another. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust 8 (2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). Properly viewed, however, the aftermarket parts that fit Kodak
machines might be a cluster market-each of these products was needed in order for a service
organization to provide full aftermarket service to owners of Kodak machines. But whether the
market definition is considered a cluster, limited to a series of individual markets for parts that
fit Kodak machines, or defined in some other way, the ultimate question remains the same: were
there anticompetitive effects arising from Kodak's conduct? In the Court's view, the plaintiffs
had offered relevant evidence tending to show anticompetitive effects. See Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,477 (1992).
79 See PORTER, supra note 10.
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The constraining role of power buyers is a reality that the federal
agency merger guidelines also acknowledge. 8
0
For additional evidence of the influence of power buyers, one
need only look to the Supreme Court's pre-Kodak tie-in cases. For
example, in United States v. IBM Corp., 81 purchasers of IBM tabulat-
ing machines were required to purchase the tied product (punch cards
that were run through the tabulating machines) only from IBM. 82 But
IBM made an exception to the tie-in requirement for at least one ma-
jor purchaser-the United States Government. Similarly, in Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States,83 the railroad imposed a tie-in that
limited the freedom of purchasers or lessees of railroad-owned land to
ship products produced on the land on rival railroads, but made ex-
ceptions for 390 (primarily large) shippers. 84
The record in other Supreme Court tie-in cases does not disclose
discrimination in favor of large buyers, but there is evidence that the
tie-in may have been shaped by a desire to limit the impact of power
buyers. For example, in International Salt Co. v. United States,85 the
tying seller of machinery for injecting salt into food products placed
limitations on the purchasers' use of salt obtained from anyone other
than the seller. One limitation allowed the purchaser of salt injection
machinery to obtain a lower salt price from International only if In-
ternational had offered that lower price to other customers. 86 This
type of "most favored nation" provision can operate to control the
incentives of both the seller and the buyer to negotiate discounts. The
seller, when confronted with the demands of a power buyer for a
lower salt price, will counter that it cannot offer the lower price with-
out also lowering the price to other customers. The power buyers, in
turn, may back down from their demands for a discounted price, real-
izing that they cannot obtain a price advantage over their rivals be-
cause the most favored nation clauses protect all customers. Review-
ing the impact of these restrictions, International Salt's tie-in might
80 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & RED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §
2.12 (rev. ed. 1997) reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569 (Apr. 8, 1997)
(noting that large buyers may create conditions incenting firms to deviate from coordinated
interaction in a market).
8' 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
82 See id. at 134.
83 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
84 See id. at 2. The exceptions for the 390 shippers are described in two economists'
analysis of the case. See F. Jay Cummings & Wayne E. Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22
J.L. & ECON. 329,344-45 (1979).
85 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
86 Another clause allowed a customer to obtain a lower price from International only if
there was a general market reduction to that price level. See Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. at 396.
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have been designed to facilitate cartel behavior at both the buyer and
seller levels.87
This brief survey of Supreme Court cases suggests that the pres-
ence of power buyers that limit the tying seller's exercise of market
power was not unique to the Kodak case. The survey also suggests
that the seller whose exercise of market power is constrained by
power buyers can use a tie-in in a number of ways to enhance supra-
competitive returns (1) to suppress competition from small rival ser-
vice providers that serve non-power buyers; (2) to foster a price dis-
crimination scheme that limits arbitrage and targets non-power buy-
ers; or (3) to facilitate cartel practices that limit competition in the
tied product market. In any of these circumstances, the tie-in will
increase the tying seller's anticompetitive gain and the Bowman cri-
tique will not apply.
B. The Premise That the Tied Product Market is Workably
Competitive
A second key premise of Bowman's critique is that before and
after imposition of the tie, there is effective competition for the tied
product. If this premise is not met, the buyer will lack competitive
alternatives and a benchmark for measuring the value of the seller's
combined offer. In either case, the buyer may end up paying a supra-
competitive price.
Of course, in many cases, the tied product market may lack ef-
fective competition even before the tie is imposed. For example, the
tied product market may be oligopolistic. This might explain the
seller's incentive for imposing the tie-in-to participate in the supra-
competitive gain available to participants in the tied product market.
But leverage theory suggests more-that through imposition of the
tie, competitive conditions are somehow worsened.
Why would a seller with coercive power decide to enforce a tie
if, as Bowman's critique suggests, there would be no increase in
overall return? Bowman's answer to this question was that tie-ins
could serve various procompetitive purposes, such as providing a me-
tering device for structuring charges based on the intensity of use of
the tying product. 88 These and other potential procompetitive effects
of tie-ins are addressed in the next section. But there is another and
obvious reason why a seller with the power to coerce would impose a
87 See Grimes, supra note 32, at 300 ("A buyer of salt who knows that his competitors
will be no more or less favorably treated may have reduced motivation for cost-conscious be-
havior. Sellers... who realized that International could retain its customers by merely meeting
a competitor's offer might also be discouraged from competing for the salt business.").8 See Bowman, supra note 73, at 28.
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tie: that it will increase the seller's overall supracompetitive gain by
restricting competition in the tied product market.
Even if the tying seller has no market power in the tied product
market, that market can become oligopolistic as the result of a wealth-
enhancing tie-in that is copied by the seller's major rivals. Tie-ins
that increase the tying seller's return are likely to be attractive to, and
will be quickly copied by, the seller's rivals. In IBM Corp. v. United
States, for example, the tie-in imposed by IBM had also been imposed
by other sellers of tabulating machines.89 Even if the tie-in does not
foster copy-cat anticompetitive behavior, the tie-in, if it complicates
the buyer's decision, can enable the seller to charge supracompetitive
prices for the tied product.
In Kodak, the tied product was service on Kodak original equip-
ment. Kodak may have been a monopolist in the service market when
its original equipment was first introduced, but later lost market share
to independent service organizations. The tie-in (selling aftermarket
parts only to those who purchased Kodak service) made it difficult or
impossible for independent service providers to obtain parts. This
difficulty raised costs for the independent service rivals and drove
some out of business. The tie-in, then, was a strategic move to pre-
serve and restore Kodak's pre-existing power in the service market.
The premise of Bowman's critique-that the tied product market was
and remained effectively competitive-may have been approaching
reality before the tie-in was imposed; that premise was thwarted by
Kodak's strategic implementation of the tie.
The conditions that gave rise to this anticompetitive injury are
likely to apply broadly when the seller of an installed-base product
ties the sale of its aftermarket parts to the purchase of its service. In
all such cases, there is a high risk that independent service providers
will face increased costs or be driven from the market. The service
provided by an original equipment manufacturer may be overpriced,
shoddy, and unresponsive to the disciplining effect that independent
service providers might otherwise generate.90 Rival producers of
original equipment may impose similar tie-ins, leaving even the most
informed purchaser no real opportunity to shop for competitive after-
market parts and service.
89 See IBM Corp., 298 U.S. at 135.
90 In franchising, a franchisee that is required to purchase input products only from a
seller approved by the franchisor will suffer similar injury.
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C. Procompetitive Benefits of Tie-Ins
Bowman offered more than simply a critique of traditional lever-
age theory. He offered a new paradigm in which tie-ins might be
viewed as natural and competitive responses to a variety of market
circumstances. Unquestionably, bundled sales can promote competi-
tion. What appears to be a tie may be an efficient bundling desired by
informed consumers. A right and left shoe are sold as a pair; a steer-
ing wheel and tires are sold as a part of an automobile. Properly ap-
plied, antitrust law would not consider such bundled sales to be tie-
ins. A tie-in occurs only when the bundled sale is coerced-when a
considerable body of informed consumers would prefer to buy the
two products separately. 9'
A related concept is the use of a tie-in to force purchasers to do
what is in their own best interest. If buyers don't have sufficient in-
formation to purchase the correct complementary products that will
make a machine function properly, a seller of the machine might im-
pose a tie to ensure that a suited product is purchased. This is the
quality control defense. Although the defense has occasionally al-
lowed a defendant to prevail,92 its use is open to question if the tying
seller might have simply provided information to buyers of the ma-
chine, indicating the quality or grade of complementary product that
is needed to ensure proper functioning.
The list of potential benefits of a tie-in has been canvassed and
analyzed elsewhere.93 It is sufficient here to examine a benefit that
Bowman accorded substantial weight: the metering hypothesis.94
Bowman postulated that market power exercised through metered use
of the tying product will reduce perverse allocative effects. If mo-
nopoly profits were extracted solely through high prices on the tying
product (with no tie-in), infrequent users of the product might be un-
able or unwilling to purchase it. With the tie-in, the market-power
profits could be more heavily extracted from the tied product, which,
if it is complementary to the tying product, might be a measure of the
intensity of use of the tying product. For example, if x-ray film is tied
to the purchase of an x-ray camera, a buyer of the camera will pur-
91 Determining when two products are efficiently bundled can be problematic in high tech
areas where new products or services are frequent and consumer buying patterns constantly
changing. Thus, a major issue in the Antitrust Division's suit against Microsoft has been
whether bundled software sales constitute an efficient bundling or a tie-in. See the discussion
of this issue in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
92 See cases cited infra note 117.
93 See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 32, at 284-92 (1994).
94 See Bowman, supra note 73, at 23-24 (listing benefits of ties including efficient market-
ing or distribution of complementary products, maintaining quality control, and enhancing mar-
ket entry or penetration).
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chase the film in direct proportion to use of the camera. If the tying
seller's market power is exercised by raising the price of the film,
intensive users will end up paying a market-power premium. If the
tying seller reduces its price for the tying product (the camera) to a
level that resulted in more sales of that product, an allocative gain
may be the result. But the surcharge for the tied product (the film)
will distort use patterns for both products. For example, a high price
for x-ray film will create a disincentive for intensive use of the x-ray
camera. This distortion creates uncertain and potentially harmful ef-
fects on the primary as well as on downstream or secondary markets.
Many less intensive users of an x-ray camera may be able to purchase
it, but the machine may be inefficiently used because of the high cost
of x-ray film.
As the preceding analysis suggests, the hypothesis that metering
will produce allocative benefits is uncertain even under the theoretical
market conditions that its proponents presume. These deficiencies are
likely to be amplified under real market conditions. Sellers with mar-
ket power are usually constrained by power buyers. If, as the factual
underpinnings of Kodak suggest, tie-ins are often a tool for a power
seller to extract gains from non-power buyers while excepting the
power buyer, the allocative analysis is further skewed. Intensive us-
ers of the tying product will have to pay more, but only up to the
point that they become sufficiently powerful to negotiate an exception
to the tie-in. Power buyer exceptions to a tie can be documented not
only in Kodak but in at least two other Supreme Court tie-in cases.95
At best, then, the allocative effects of a tie-in operating under such
real market conditions are highly ambiguous and may be harmful.
There is less ambiguity, however, about the wealth-transfer ef-
fects of a metering tie. All purchasers who end up paying more than
the competitive price for the bundled products will suffer a wealth
transfer loss. If Bowman's critique of leverage theory were widely
descriptive, the wealth transfer losses suffered by buyers would be no
greater as a result of use of a tie-in (although the wealth transfer pay-
ments might target different buyers). The previous analysis suggests,
however, that under widely applicable conditions, a tying seller will
increase anticompetitive gains through use of a metering tie-in, so
wealth transfer losses will increase proportionately. Wealth transfer
losses from exercises of market power are likely to be substantial,
95 See IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134 (1936) (tie was not imposed against
the government). In Northern Pacific v. United States, the railroad apparently did not impose
the tie against 390 of its large customers. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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probably significantly larger than the allocative losses associated with
exercises of market power.
96
Perhaps the point is obvious, but it warrants restating here: sell-
ers don't engage in tying because it allocates products more effi-
ciently. Ties are imposed to increase profits. Sellers are not prescient
and will not know about the nuances of efficient allocation in the
primary market, much less the secondary markets, that will be af-
fected by the tie-in. The tying seller would not be heard to say: "Let's
do this tie because it will more efficiently distribute our product."
Instead, the seller would say: "let's do this tie because we can make
more money." Granted that if markets (aside from the market power
the seller possesses in the tying product) were competitive and buyers
were prescient, making more money through a metering tie-in might
lead to a more efficient allocation. But that is never evident in the
litigated cases. A survey of the Supreme Court's tie-in cases and a
sampling of roughly fifty court of appeals cases was unable to iden-
tify a single one in which the metering hypothesis would apply.97 A
separate analysis of International Salt, a case that some have sug-
gested fits the metering hypothesis, concluded that a metering expla-
nation is unlikely.98
Finally, even if all of the factual suppositions for efficient meter-
ing were in place, there are likely to be more efficient and less harm-
ful ways of measuring and charging for intensity of use of the tying
product.99 For example, franchisors can require franchisees to use
computerized cash registers that make a record of every sale of a
franchised product. By avoiding use of tie-ins, the tying seller can
adjust pricing to intensity of use without the anticompetitive effects
attending many tie-ins. A seller that abjures the use of such readily
available (and less anticompetitive) metering mechanisms is vulner-
able to the conclusion that it chose the tie-in for anticompetitive gain.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO KODAK
Critics of the Kodak decision have raised a variety of objections,
including (1) that Kodak is revolutionary and will spark a flood of
96 In the neo-classical economist's model, monopoly profits (wealth transfer) are repre-
sented by a rectangle that may have twice the volume of the triangle representing allocative or
deadweight losses. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135, fig.5.2 (2d ed. 1994) (depicting monopoly profit maximization). See also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, § 1.3c, at 20-23 (explaining that much of what might have been the
wealth transfer loss will be eaten up by entrenching or rent-seeking behavior).
97 See Grimes, supra note 32, at 299-315.
98 See John C. Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 351, 352-59
(1979).
99 See Kaplow, supra note 77, at 541-42 (defining metered pricing and alternatives in
relation to tying arrangements).
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meritless or unwise litigation; (2) that the information theories under-
lying Kodak do not raise legitimate antitrust issues and should be ad-
dressed, if at all, through contract remedies or consumer protection
law; (3) that the decision will create cost, uncertainty, and administra-
tive nightmares for litigants and courts because of the complexity of
the required analysis; and (4) that workable remedies for antitrust vio-
lations based on Kodak are difficult or impossible to devise. For the
most part, these objections do not question that abusive or anticom-
petitive conduct could occur as the result of the relational market
power identified in Kodak, but rather focus on whether antitrust law
can or should address these issues.
A. Is Kodak Revolutionary or Evolutionary?
Justice Scalia's dissent in Kodak provided a preview of the ar-
guments that critics have advanced in challenging Kodak. The dissent
suggested that the majority's holding would unleash a torrent of liti-
gation against every producer of original equipment that sold after-
market parts. 1°° Indeed, the relational market power that was at issue
in Kodak extends to franchise relationships or to any enduring eco-
nomic relationship in which one firm is locked in as the result of sunk
costs.
In the ten years since Kodak, plaintiffs have sought to rely on
Kodak's holding primarily in aftermarket cases and in franchise cases.
The majority of the reported cases were victories for the defendant.' 0°
Whatever the outcome, two questions arise: (1) would the application
of Kodak principles in these cases abruptly alter or revolutionize the
law and (2) would such an application produce a torrent of litigation
that is inconsistent with fundamental antitrust principles?
Kodak's focus on information imperfections as a basis for find-
ing a coercive tie-in is novel in Supreme Court cases. But it also has
great descriptive power in explaining older cases that had found un-
lawful ties. At least on six occasions prior to Kodak, the Supreme
Court ruled for the plaintiff in a tie-in case involving deferred pur-
chases of the tied product and, transparently, significant information
issues. 102 Information issues were not squarely addressed in any of
1oo See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 489 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
101 See infra Part V.
102 See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (alleging oil company induced gas sta-
tions to buy tires, batteries, and accessories); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968) (conditioning award of a franchise on purchase of Midas Muffler products);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (alleging tire company required ARCO dealers to
buy its products); No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (alleging that Railway
induced lessees to use only freight transport as condition of awarding the lease); Int'l Salt Co. v.
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these opinions nor, apparently, were they briefed by the parties. Pre-
1980 tie-in decisions rarely addressed information issues for the sim-
ple reason that theorists -had not made the necessary connection be-
tween the tying seller's coercive power and possible information in-
adequacies of the buyer. It was not until Craswell's 1982 article that
information issues were out of the closet.
103
Kodak analysis offers potential insight and explanatory power in
re-examining these old cases. °4 Vindication of past rulings on new
or different grounds cannot fairly be labeled revolutionary. A reas-
sessment based on new market insights offers hope of greater clarity
and certainty in future counseling, enforcement choices, and court
decisions. The broader or revolutionary implications of Kodak, what-
ever they might be, have yet to be demonstrated in the case law.
B. Do Information Theories Underlying Kodak Raise Legitimate
Antitrust Issues?
Justice Scalia's dissent argued that whatever information imper-
fections may arise in tie-in cases such as Kodak do not implicate anti-
trust: "this 'circumstantial' leverage created by consumer investment
regularly crops up in smoothly functioning, even perfectly competi-
tive, markets, and in most-if not all--of its manifestations, it is of no
concern to the antitrust laws. . . [The leverage] produces only 'a
brief perturbation in competitive conditions-not the sort of thing the
antitrust laws do or should worry about."
' 10 5
Information issues have been a part of antitrust analysis for the
better part of a century. In Justice Brandeis' influential 1918 opinion
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,'06 the Board had issued a
rule freezing the price at the closing market level for after-hours
trades of grain futures. The Government attacked the rule as unlawful
price-fixing. In upholding the rule under rule of reason analysis, the
Court cited in support the information inadequacies confronting after-
hours traders.107 The high Court's most recent acknowledgment of
the relevance of information issues came in California Dental Ass'n
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (conditioning lease of salt refining equipment on future
purchase of defendant's salt); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (alleging that
defendant's tabulating equipment lease was tied to future purchase of punch-cards).
103 See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 671-78 (1982) (identifying three types of informational
deficiencies).
10 See Grimes, supra note 32, at 299-307 (reassessing past Supreme Court holdings in
light of Kodak).
"5 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc.,
866 F.2d 288,236 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
"6 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
117 See id. at 244-45.
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v. FTC.10 8 Whether the Court's analysis in these cases was correct
can be debated. The point is that buyers' ability to assess and weigh
information has long been a part of the fabric of antitrust decision.
Information and lock-in issues have also played a silent but piv-
otal role in cases involving small players that are likely targets of re-
lational market power. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp. 19 is a prime example. A ski lift operator brought a section 2
action claiming that a larger rival firm's refusal to continue past co-
operation in issuing all-area lift tickets constituted a monopoly abuse.
The Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions that found a sec-
tion 2 violation. The relevant market issue was not open at the point
of review, so the Court accepted the Aspen area resorts as the appro-
priate market. Yet, in the words of one commentary, one town "can-
not possibly be a plausible relevant geographic market for downhill
skiing services provided by destination ski resorts."110 One might still
defend the Aspen result based on harm to the small percentage of lo-
cal users of the ski facilities. Still, eight years after the Court's deci-
sion, the larger resort was allowed to purchase its smaller rival with-
out any challenge under the merger laws, an enforcement decision
that suggests that there was not a significant local relevant market that
would be at risk."'
The Aspen result does make sense, however, as an exercise of
relational market power that was harmful to consumers. The defen-
dants terminated all-area lift tickets that had been initiated when As-
pen had only three resorts, each under separate ownership. All-area
lift tickets were apparently efficient. Similar tickets are issued at des-
tination ski resorts throughout the world. And record evidence indi-
cated that Aspen skiers preferred to have the option of purchasing an
all-area ticket.'12 So the plaintiff might quite logically make invest-
ments in its resort, some of which would be sunk or unrecoverable,
based on the assumption that efficient cooperation in issuing all-area
lift tickets would continue. Indeed, the cooperation did continue until
the larger rival ended up with three of the four local resorts, and was
in a position to profit at its smaller rival's expense by offering three-
area tickets that excluded the plaintiff's ski lifts. These three-area
'0" See 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999) ("The existence of significant challenges to informal
decisionmaking by the customer for professional services suggests that advertising restrictions
arguably protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory
treatment....").
'09 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
S10 DANIEL J. GIFFoRD & LEO J. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 386 (1998).
111 See Ski Merger May Perk up Aspen, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1993, § 1, at 37.
112 See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605-07 (surveying expert testimony and anecdotal evidence of
consumer preference).
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tickets were not the most efficient marketing mechanism (because
they were not the consumer's preference), but they raised the costs of
plaintiff, allowed the defendant to profit at the plaintiff' s expense, and
put pressure on the plaintiff to sell out at a depressed price. Plaintiff's
resort would be worth less because the pattern of efficient cooperation
that had been the basis of past sunk investments had now been termi-
nated.
Relational market power may also be a basis (frequently un-
stated) for sustaining antitrust claims brought by employees. In Law
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,1 3 a class of entry level assistant
basketball coaches successfully sued the NCAA based on a rule that
limited to $16,000 the salary that Division I schools could pay these
coaches. Member schools were allowed to hire up to four full-time
coaches, but the NCAA rule was designed to limit the amount that its
member schools could pay to the fourth coach. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment that the NCAA's action was
unlawful price-fixing under a truncated rule of reason analysis. As in
Aspen, the relevant market was not defined. To make sense, however,
a price-fixing claim must assume that the defendants exercised power
over a market consisting of this narrow class of assistant basketball
coaches working for a group of NCAA member schools. Yet any
person working in such a position would have other basketball coach-
ing positions available at other NCAA schools, junior colleges, pro-
fessional or semi-professional teams, in high schools, or in commu-
nity or youth programs.
114
In explaining its holding, the court of appeals looked to the anti-
competitive effects of the price-fixing arrangement. There was un-
disputed evidence that the rule resulted in lowering the pay for many
of the coaches holding the fourth full-time position." 5 The market
power that the NCAA might exercise over this narrow class of assis-
tant coaches may be linked to the reputation of basketball programs at
Division I schools. Working for such a program, even if it had a con-
sistent losing record, might be seen as a good experience for a novice
coach seeking to build a resume. But there is also a link to the sunk
costs that any employee has in a permanent position. 116 To accept
another position, the employee must contemplate the costs of a job
13 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
114 The NCAA argued for such a broader market definition. See id. at 1019 n.12.
"' See id. at 1020 ("The NCAA adopted the REC ("restricted earnings coach") Rule to
reduce the high cost of part-time coaches' salaries, over $60,000 annually in some cases, by
limiting compensation to entry-level coaches to $16,000 per year. The NCAA does not dispute
that the cost-reduction has effectively reduced restricted-earnings coaches' salaries.").
116 For a discussion of the relational market power that employers often have in dealings
with employees, see Grimes, supra note 18, at 199-200, 201-04.
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search, of learning to work with new people and under different con-
ditions and rules, and probably of moving possessions and family to a
new location, a move that may involve selling one house and purchas-
ing another. These costs are not so high as to deter employees from
searching for new opportunities, but they are sufficiently high to give
additional power to an employer in bargaining with an employee.
The NCAA case, then, is illustrative of employee antitrust claims that
involve a significant albeit usually unmentioned component of rela-
tional power built upon information and lock-in realities.
In tie-in cases, information issues also have a venerable tradition,
albeit the pre-Kodak history was almost exclusively on the defense
side. Defendants have argued, sometimes successfully, that a tie-in
may be required to assure that complementary products used with the
tying product are of an adequate quality to ensure that the tying prod-
uct functions properly (and that the tying seller's quality reputation is
not undermined).' 1 7 The quality control defense is based on the prem-
ise that the purchaser has insufficient information or understanding to
make wise choices for the complementary product. This information-
based defense is well-anchored in tie-in law and has been endorsed by
Chicago theorists such as Bork.
11 8
Can it be that information-based theory is appropriate fodder for
the defendant but not for the plaintiff? Such a discriminatory ap-
proach is difficult to justify. But some critics of Kodak suggest that
while plaintiffs may raise legitimate information-based issues in the
context of a tie-in, those issues should be addressed through contract
law or consumer protection law, not through antitrust law.
1. Contract Law As an Alternative Remedy
Protecting the integrity of the contract enforcement system
against antitrust incursions is a worthy goal if contract law provides
better or more refined remedies for information-based competition
abuses.' 9 But proponents of this view apparently favor contract law
117 For example, the quality control defense was invoked in three cases involving an auto-
mobile manufacturer's requirements that dealers purchase only manufacturer approved spare
parts. The defendants prevailed in Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d
792 (1st Cir. 1988) and in Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1987). A jury verdict for the plaintiff was upheld in Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler Benz
Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987).
118 See ROBERT BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 380 (1978) ("The problem is one of informa-
tion and policing. The manufacturer is likely to understand the technical problems of his ma-
chines better than the lessees.").
119 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of Kodak:
Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283
(1999) (offering support for this view). I offered a different view in Warren S. Grimes, Market
Definition in Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the Franchisor's Con-
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in part because it does not provide remedies for claims that might be
heard under the Sherman Act.1 20 Contract-based remedies, assuming
they are available, will be unlikely to address competition issues ade-
quately. Preserving or protecting competition is not a primary policy
goal of contract enforcement. Perhaps most decisively, it would be
foolish to carve out of tie-in cases information issues that are inte-
grally related to the competitive assessment of the tie-in. For exam-
ple, tie-ins may have cartel enhancement effects (an issue theorists
would generally agree is within the parameters of an antitrust claim).
But a tie-in's cartel enhancement effects can be increased if the tie-in
exploits the buyer's information inadequacies. A court should not be
forced to put on blinders when making an assessment of factors that
might enhance or mitigate these cartel effects. Just as a defendant is
able to raise information inadequacies as a part of a quality control
defense for a tie-in, a plaintiff must be allowed to raise information
issues that might exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of a tie-in.
As an example of the potential overreaching impact of Kodak,
critics point to the simple contract holdup. If a landowner contracts to
have a building constructed, the contractor, after doing substantial
construction work, might delay performance and demand additional
compensation as a condition for going forward. As a result of the
landowner's sunk investment in the contract and the high cost in ne-
gotiating with a new contractor, the landowner may be coerced into
additional payments.
A contractor that engages in such holdup behavior is not an ap-
propriate antitrust target. But how is this behavior to be distinguished
from the facts in Kodak? The answer lies in antitrust's commitment
to address only those competitive abuses that arise from an exercise
of market power. Kodak suggests such an abuse of market power.
The tie-in allowed Kodak to raise prices, limit output, or reduce the
quality of aftermarket parts and service. If the abuse substantially
raised Kodak's anticompetitive gain, one could anticipate that similar
ties would be adopted by rivals and by other sellers of installed-base
products. In contrast, the contract holdup may not involve market
power as understood in antitrust. The starting point for a definition of
market power is the ability to limit output and raise price without in-
curring a decrease in sales such as to make the price rise unprofit-
flict of Interest, 67 ANTrrRusT L.J. 243 (1999) (arguing that franchisors exercise relational
market power over franchisees and contract-based remedies are insufficient to prevent such
anticompetitive activity).
120 See Klein, supra note 119, at 325 n.104 (arguing that contract law should be favored
because it is less likely than antitrust law to interfere with literal enforcement of contract lan-
guage).
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able. 121 But there is more to an antitrust definition of market power.
In particular, theorists generally agree that market power does not
include temporary market perturbations 2 2 such as might occur in the
contract hold-up. A contract hold-up might cross the market-power
threshold only if it occurs in the context of an enduring economic re-
lationship in which continuing or repeated exercises of power are
possible.
Tie-in law, as circumscribed by the Supreme Court, also contains
a requirement that in order to prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the tie-in involves substantial commerce in the tied product.'2 A
contract hold-up involving a one-time contractual relationship often
will not involve a significant amount of commerce in the tied product
market. These distinctions offer a principled basis for distinguishing
a contract hold-up from a legitimate antitrust claim. That application
of these principles can be difficult in factually complex cases affords
no basis for abandoning legitimate antitrust tie-in claims.
2. Consumer Protection Law As an Alternative Remedy
Other critics of Kodak have suggested that the remedy for infor-
mation abuses that underlie a tie-in should be through consumer pro-
tection law. This was Justice Scalia's view expressed in the dissent
and was the suggestion of Craswell in his landmark 1982 article that
first analyzed the risks of information abuses in tie-ins.124
Statutes that address deceptive advertising and consumer decep-
tion have a long history and substantial judicial interpretations to
guide their application. But consumer deception laws primarily ad-
dress deceptive or misleading statements, not the lack of information
that may be the basis of a tie-in's anticompetitive effects. Although
competition issues sometimes guide consumer protection enforce-
ment, these laws are not primarily concerned with anticompetitive
effects. A deceptive advertisement that materially deceives consum-
ers can be unlawful regardless of its competitive effects or, indeed,
even if there is evidence that the deceptive ad might have procompeti-
tive effects. A seller that deceives the public about the source of a
product will be guilty of deceptive advertising even if its price/quality
mix is superior to all rival products, including the one that the de-
121 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 40, § 2.2, at 22.
122 See id. § 2.2, at 23.
12 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,462 (1992).
124 See id. at 495 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Craswell, supra note 103, at 679-81 (comparing
consumer concern regarding tie-ins with unenforceable contract clauses placing unconscionable
obligations on buyers).
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ceived consumer thought it was purchasing. 125 There is no consumer
protection remedy that will allow a seller to avoid the information
losses (arising from inadequate consumer information about properly
performing complementary products) that are the basis for invoking
the quality control defense to a tie-in claim. Likewise, there is no
established consumer protection remedy for addressing a tie-in's anti-
competitive effects that spring from a lack of buyer information about
life cycle pricing or related matters. Neither a defendant invoking a
quality control defense nor a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate a tie-
in's anticompetitive effects should be precluded from introducing
evidence of informational problems because of any pretense that con-
sumer protection law adequately addresses the issue. Those who say
that the remedy for a tie-in's information problems should lie with
consumer protection law may be advocating no remedy126
Even assuming that there were a consumer protection remedy for
exploitation of the lack of consumer information in a tie-in, it is un-
clear how the consumer protection issues would be separated from the
tie-in's anticompetitive effects. The anticompetitive effect of a harm-
ful tie-in is frequently linked to the deferred purchase of the tied
product, a circumstance that usually raises information problems. But
that same tie-in may raise a number of other competition issues, in-
cluding: (1) raising the costs of or foreclosing rivals in the market for
the tied product; (2) implementing a price discrimination scheme that
targets small buyers; or (3) fostering cartel practices among rivals of
the tying seller or among purchasers of the bundled products. These
anticompetitive effects, although they could occur in a world of per-
fect information, can be exacerbated by information inadequacies.
For example, if the information deficiencies of purchasers are sub-
stantial and widespread, this will likely increase the tie's effectiveness
in attaining any of the three listed anticompetitive effects.
Kodak illustrates this difficulty in separating information issues
from other anticompetitive effects. If Kodak's tie of aftermarket parts
and service is successful in part because of consumer difficulty in
projecting life cycle costs, this success will contribute directly to the
tie's other anticompetitive effects. The tie will be more effective in
effecting a price discrimination scheme and will give Kodak more
125 Deceptive advertisements about the source of a product would violate section 43 of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998) (private enforcement), Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. § 52 (1998) (FTC enforcement), and numerous state law provisions (private or state
enforcement).
126 In his dissent, Justice Scalia did not contend that Kodak's conduct violated any con-
sumer protection law. He asserted only that the conduct "may have implicated truth-in-
advertising or other consumer protection concerns." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 494-95 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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power to affect price, quality and output of the bundled products.
Rivals in the service market will face higher costs in obtaining after-
market parts and may be foreclosed entirely from the Kodak service
market.
C. The Cost and Workability of Kodak Theories
Another concern is that Kodak claims will confront counselors
and courts with difficult and intractable issues that are beyond their
powers to resolve.1 27 Kodak itself is a complicated three level case
involving an installed-base product, and a second-level tie-in linking
aftermarkets for parts and service. On remand, the tie-in issue was
sufficiently complex that the plaintiffs attorney chose not to pursue
it, relying only on the section 2 monopolization claims.
28
One cannot be sure what future use will be made of Kodak. It is
possible that future litigants will propose creative but complex case
theories that will severely challenge juries and courts. So far, at least,
that has not happened. In reported lower court decisions,12 9 Kodak
has been relied upon primarily in tie-in cases brought under section 1
or section 2 of the Sherman Act. One can foresee that Kodak's in-
formation analysis will apply for other claims in which a seller's
power dictates downstream behavior for a relatively powerless buyer.
Thus, some exclusive dealing and vertical maximum price-fixing
cases will include Kodak issues.
But all of these claims are traditional antitrust claims. Kodak's
information analysis would be a supplement to traditional analysis,
not a new paradigm that discards past law. In many cases, the sup-
plement would be enlightening and clarifying, one that could lead to
greater confidence and predictability in the results. As courts become
more experienced in addressing information issues, presumptions and
precedents can provide further guidance, some of it helpful to defen-
dants in obtaining dismissal of non-meritorious actions, some of it
helpful to plaintiffs in demonstrating genuine anticompetitive con-
duct.
An example is the significance of a tie-in involving a deferred
purchase of the tied product. Tie-ins that involve simultaneous pur-
chase of both the tying and tied product may be anticompetitive, but
they are less likely to raise information issues than ties that require
the buyer to continue to purchase the tied product over a long or in-
definite period. The life cycle pricing issues of Kodak arose because
127 See Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 8-9.
128 See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.
1997).
129 See infra Part V.B (surveying cases that followed or declined to follow Kodak).
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purchase of both the tying and tied product was deferred, sometimes
long after the purchase of the original equipment. These issues may
not come up when there is no deferred purchase of either the tying or
tied products. Some clarifying precedents, or even a presumption,
might arise out of this simple, common sense observation. For exam-
ple, courts might well decide to shift the burden of persuasion as to
information claims depending on whether deferred purchases are in-
volved.
With time and experience, courts will have an opportunity to
pinpoint other critical factors.130 For example, if the tie is imposed
uniformly against all buyers, it will not discriminate against non-
power buyers, a fact that may support a valid defense such as the
quality control defense. A uniformly imposed tie may still have cartel
enhancing effects, but the Court's competitive inquiry can be guided
and narrowed through sensitivity to this factor.
D. Are there Workable Remedies for Kodak Claims?
One of the objections to Kodak theories has been a perceived
difficulty in fashioning a remedy. In cases involving abuse of after-
market product, it has been suggested that a court must respond not
only by forcing a sale of aftermarket products, but "must also set the
price at which these things are to be sold, and perhaps other terms as
well." 1
31
Many tie-in cases that might be brought under a Kodak theory
would not involve aftermarkets. Tie-ins in franchising cases, for ex-
ample, typically involve a forced tie of input goods that the franchisee
resells to customers. 3 2 If such ties are found to be unlawful, the sim-
plest of injunctive provisions would address the abuse: order the fran-
chisor to stop requiring franchisees to purchase the input product only
from the designated vendor. Of course, the plaintiff may also seek
damages, and this may present the parties and the court with more
difficult evidentiary problems. There is, however, nothing novel
about damage claims in franchise tie-in cases, and nothing in Kodak
that would make the burden of proving damages more difficult. The
damages caused by the tie will not change simply because of a re-
finement in the underlying reasoning that led the court to conclude
130 See Grimes, supra note 32,.at 273-79 (suggesting such factors as the complexity of the
purchase decision, the frequency with which the product is required by the buyer, and the dis-
parity in value between the tying and tied products).
131 Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 7.
132 See, e.g., Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430,433 (3d Cir. 1997)
(requiring franchisee to purchase franchisor's pizza dough); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d
43,46 (9th Cir. 1971) (requiring purchase of supplies); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, 59 F. Supp.
2d 1312, 1313 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (requiring purchase of food products).
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that the tie was unlawful. If the plaintiff cannot bear its burden of
proving damages, then damage relief should be denied, but that is no
reason to deny a simple and effective injunction that would halt the
abusive practice.
Cases involving claims of aftermarket abuse are, like franchise
tie-in claims, not new to antitrust. 133 One type of aftermarket case
involves efforts by a manufacturer to prevent dealers from selling
spare parts produced or distributed by non-approved sources. Here
again, simple injunctive relief should be effective (requiring the
manufacturer to allow dealers to purchase from other sources).
Where the tie-in, as in Kodak, was an effort to restrict or eliminate
competition in the service market by limiting the sale of spare parts,
the injunctive relief could be more complex. But this sort of relief
should generally not require the court to become involved in the price
or terms of sale. The injunction might simply require that the parts be
sold to all comers on non-discriminatory terms, or that the manufac-
turer cease efforts to restrict the flow of parts to independent service
providers. As to damages, the same points addressed in connection
with franchise tie-ins are relevant here: the burden is on the plaintiff
to establish damages and failure to bear that burden means that dam-
age relief would be denied.
The great bulk of cases involving seller power abuses, whether
those claims be based on tie-ins, forced exclusive dealing, or vertical
maximum price-fixing, involve traditional antitrust law. The circum-
stance that a plaintiff might rely on a Kodak theory to establish a vio-
lation generally does not make the crafting of a remedy more or less
complicated than would have occurred in a pre-Kodak era. To the
extent Kodak takes courts into new or uncharted territory, there may
be instances in which practical remedies are illusive or administra-
tively infeasible. But those uncertain future cases are no reason to
excuse anticompetitive conduct in mainline antitrust claims.
V. KODAK IN THE COURTS
Measured only by the frequency of citations, Kodak has had sub-
stantial impact on lower court decisions. Many of these citations
have been to Kodak's recitation of the standards for summary judg-
133 See, e.g., Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3, 3 (1936) (manufacturer
required car dealers to use only new parts manufactured or approved by manufacturer); United
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 456 (1922) (lease provisions required lessees
to use lessor's machinery or forfeit right to its use); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz
Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Cir. 1987) (car dealership franchisor required
franchisees to buy replacement parts only from franchisor).
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ment. 134 This aspect of Kodak may have been somewhat obscured by
the subsequent language in Brooke Group.'35 Moreover, citations to
standards for granting or denying summary judgment are often per-
functory; after disposing of this necessary preliminary, the court pro-
ceeds to follow its own predispositions. Kodak notwithstanding,
those predispositions are likely to be linked to the credibility that a
judge grants to an economic theory and, in particular, to the court's
willingness to address squarely the evidence (or lack of evidence) of
actual anticompetitive effects.
Below Kodak's impact on federal and state antitrust litigation is
addressed on two levels that are most likely to indicate the decision's
longer term impact: (1) Kodak as a symbol of empiricism in antitrust,
or as a reminder that evidence of actual anticompetitive effects (or the
absence of those anticompetitive effects) should trump rote applica-
tion of screening rules or doctrines that might dictate the outcome of
the case and (2) Kodak as a precedent for looking to information in-
adequacies and the coercive effect of sunk investment in antitrust
claims involving alleged seller power abuses (tie-ins, forced exclusive
dealing, vertical maximum price-fixing, and related section 2 claims).
A. Kodak and Empirical Analysis
As described above in Part I.D.2, doctrinal developments in
Sherman Act interpretation often lead to a period of mechanical or
rote application to widening fact patterns. Screening rules developed
to check perceived enforcement excesses of the Populist era are a
prime example. Over time, lawyers and courts have predictably
fallen into patterns of extending these rules to fact patterns that over-
reach the rule's empirical validity. That is why Kodak's call foy re-
turning to fundamental antitrust principles-asking whether a particu-
lar behavior produces anticompetitive effects-is critical. Looking at
the ensuing decade, an observer might single out a number of cases
where this rule was followed or ignored.
In FTC v. Staples, Inc.,36 the agency successfully blocked a pro-
posed combination of the two largest discount office supply chains in
the country. The case was unusual for its use of direct pricing evi-
dence to show that prices tended to be higher in cities in which only
134 See, e.g., Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 1998) ("In evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence, facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment."); PSI Repair Servs. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d
811, 814 (6th Cir. 1997) (reciting similar summary judgment standard); City of Long Beach v.
Standard Oil Co., 46 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972
F.2d 1483, 1495 (8th Cir. 1992) (same).
... See infra Part ID.
'36 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
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one office superstore operated than in areas in which two or more su-
perstores were present.137 This direct empirical support allowed the
FTC to defend an unusually narrow market definition-a market con-
sisting only of office supply superstores-in the face of the defen-
dants' claims that customers could purchase office supplies from a
variety of other types of stores. In sustaining the FTC's position, the
court did not cite Kodak, but its holding was consistent with Justice
Blackmun's focus on real market evidence of anticompetitive effects.
In Toys "R'" Us, Inc. v. FTC,138 the agency again prevailed in
court on what some might perceive as a vulnerable market definition.
Toys "R" Us ("TRU") was found to have violated the Sherman Act
and the FTC Act through its efforts to organize toy manufacturers to
limit sales to the warehouse clubs, perceived by Toys "R" Us as a
threat to its leading position as a toy retailer. Although Toys "R" Us
sold more than forty percent of the toys sold in some urban markets,
its overall share of retail sales of toys in the U.S. was only about
twenty percent. 139 But the court of appeals was unconcerned with this
relatively small market share because of the demonstrated anticom-
petitive effects of the defendant's conduct. Without reference to Ko-
dak, the court stated:
TRU seems to think that anticompetitive effects in a market
cannot be shown unless the plaintiff, or here the Commis-
sion, first proves that it has a large market share. This, how-
ever, has things backwards. As we have explained else-
where, the share a firm has in a properly defined relevant
market is only a way of estimating market power, which is
the ultimate consideration. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that there are two ways of proving market power. One
is through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.
140
There was evidence in the record that after several years of rapid in-
creases in the warehouse clubs' share of the toy market, this growth
was stifled or reversed after Toys "R" Us persuaded toy manufactur-
ers to limit sales to the clubs.
14 1
137 See id. at 1076 (finding that Staples charged thirteen percent more (and Office Depot
five percent more) in one firm markets than in three firm markets).
'38 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1999).
39 See id. at 930.
140 Id. at 937 (citations omitted).
141 See id. at 933.
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If Staples and Toys "R" Us are deemed victories for Kodak em-
piricism, then the district court's dismissal of the Justice Depart-
ment's predatory pricing case against American Airlines was a de-
feat. 142 In the face of evidence that a small airline's entry into a city-
pair market had produced lower prices for consumers, and that
American Airlines' strategically employed increase in competing
flights and discounted fares had driven the rival from the market, the
court granted summary judgment for American Airlines "because it at
most matched the prices of its competitors, and because there is no
dangerous probability (even assuming below-cost pricing) of recoup-
ment of American's supposed profits by means of supra-competitive
pricing."'143 Assuming this mechanical application of the Supreme
Court's test was solidly rooted in the evidence (for purposes of sum-
mary judgment, to be construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff), the decision gives short shrift to evidence of actual anti-
competitive effects. For example, American increased the number of
flights that it offered on the contested route, then discontinued the
added flights after the smaller rival had abandoned the route, conduct
that is comparable to the use of "fighting ships" long outlawed under
maritime law' 44 and difficult to construe as anything other than a stra-
tegic ploy to drive the smaller rival from the market. The prices paid
by consumers were down during the contested phase but were raised
to precontest (or higher) levels soon after the small rival was driven
from the market. In addition, there was record evidence of Ameri-
can's intent to drive its smaller rivals from the market, including a
statement of American's CEO to the effect that "If you are not going
to get them out then no point to diminish profit."'145
The AMR decision notwithstanding, the federal agencies will
likely have more success than private plaintiffs in resisting mechani-
cal applications of screening rules that do violence to competition
goals. One would expect this result because the agencies often have a
credibility with the court that a private plaintiff may lack. The agen-
cies may also possess the resources to do an empirical survey of anti-
142 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), appeal docketed
(10th Cir. 2001).
143 id. at 1218.
1'4 Fighting ships used by international ocean cartels were banned by section 14 of the
Shipping Act of 1916,46 U.S.C. § 812 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(6)).
'45 AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. Intent evidence has had a long history in preda-
tory pricing cases. See SuLLvAN & GRIMES, supra note 40, § 4.3c, at 155-56. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court disregarded intent evidence in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp, 509 U.S. 209, 232 (1993), because it was deemed implausible in light of the
oligopolistic conditions prevailing in the cigarette industry. Brooke Group is distinguishable
because American Airlines, unlike the cigarette firms, could act unilaterally (as a monopolist
would) without the participation of other airlines.
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competitive effects that private litigants cannot conduct. Nonetheless,
one noteworthy success for private plaintiffs occurred in Law v.
NCAA. 146 A price-fixing violation involving a limited class of assis-
tant basketball coaches for Division I basketball universities was sus-
tained by the court based on the showing of "actual anticompetitive
effects."' 47
B. Kodak as a Precedent in Seller Abuse Cases
1. Cases Affirmatively Relying on Kodak
Looking only at seller abuse cases in which Kodak theories of
information inadequacies and lock-in were alleged, Kodak's impact
has been measured. Most of the cases have involved aftermarket
products (installed-base opportunism) 148 or franchising, 149 although
there have been scattered cases involving other fact patterns.1 50 The
larger body of reported cases in which plaintiffs have advanced a Ko-
dak theory resulted in litigated judgments for the defendants. There
are, however, a number of significant cases in which the court, rely-
ing upon Kodak, has ruled for the plaintiff.
Federal courts of appeals have affirmatively relied on a Kodak
theory in two cases involving a seller-abuse claim, one of them Kodak
on remand.1 51  A few district courts have affirmatively relied on Ko-
dak in denying defendants' pretrial motions for summary judgment or
dismissal. 152  And the Nebraska Supreme Court relied squarely on
Kodak in applying state antitrust law in an aftermarket case with facts
146 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
141 Id. at 1020-21. See also the discussion of this case supra Part IV.B.
148 See, e.g., Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1221 (E.D.
Cal. 1999) (alleging manufacturer of medical anesthesia equipment tied parts and services);
Heath Consultants v. Precision Instruments, 527 N.W.2d 596 (Neb. 1995) (alleging manufac-
turer of leak equipment tied parts).
149 See, e.g., Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997) (alleg-
ing franchisor required franchisees to purchase products); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (same); Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 984 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. La.
1997) (same).
150 See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T, 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (alleged conspiracy to deprive
employees of pension rights); Mellon v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Kan. 1998)
(alleging section 2 claim in an alleged market confined to one type of the manufacturer's jet
aircraft based on manufacturer's refusal to service the plaintiff's airplane).
's' See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997);
Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 995 F.2d 1324 (6th Cir. 1993), opinion withdrawn,
11 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1993).
152 See Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment in antitrust claims of an aftermarket tie and related section 2 offenses);
Collins, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (denying motion to dismiss denied in a franchising tie-in claim);
Mellon, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1196 (denying summary judgment in section 2 claim based on defen-
dant's refusal to service the plaintiff's aircraft).
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strikingly similar to Kodak 153 Although significant, this collection of
affirmative citations hardly suggests the broad impact that proponents
expected or that critics feared.
There may be a number of reasons for this relatively small num-
ber of affirmative citations. First, there is surely a body of unreported
settled cases in which the plaintiffs had strong Kodak arguments.
154
One would expect that defendants would be most likely to settle a
case in which the plaintiff's theory is strongly anchored in the law
and facts. There may also be cases in which the parties simply failed
to make Kodak arguments that might have been available to them.
For example, in the Supreme Court briefs in State Oil v. Khan,155 a
case involving an alleged seller power abuse in which a Kodak theory
was a natural fit, neither the parties nor the Federal Government's
amicus brief relied upon Kodak Even when a Kodak theory has ex-
planatory power, the plaintiffs' bar may be hesitant to rely on Kodak
because of the frosty reception that a number of appellate courts have
accorded the decision, as discussed below.
2. Cases Declining to Follow Kodak
Turning to the larger body of cases that have declined to follow
Kodak, the decisions generally have fallen into three categories: (1)
cases in which the courts have interpreted Kodak narrowly to apply
only when a defendant has changed its conduct after the tying product
has been sold; (2) cases that refuse to recognize tie-in claims because
antitrust law is trumped by intellectual property law; and (3) cases in
which courts have simply ignored or misunderstood Kodak while
rotely applying screening rules that would allow dismissal of a case.
(a) Requiring a Change of Policy After the Lock-In
In Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of America,156 in 1994, the First Cir-
cuit declined to follow Kodak because, in the panel's view:
[T]he timing of the 'lock in' at issue in Kodak was central to
the Supreme Court's decision .... Had previous customers
known, at the time they bought their Kodak copiers, that Ko-
dak would implement its restrictive parts-servicing policy,
Kodak's 'market power,' i.e., its leverage to induce custom-
153 See Heath Consultants v. Precision Instruments, 527 N.W.2d 596 (Neb. 1995).
154 1 was a consultant in one such aftermarket tie-in case involving a major automobile
manufacturer. A protective order precludes discussion of the parties or the settlement terms.
'-' 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
'56 23 F.3d 14 (lst Cir. 1994).
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ers to purchase Kodak servicing, could only have been as
significant as its [market power] in the copier market, which
was stipulated to be inconsequential or nonexistent.
157
This reading was picked up in other circuits.158 Although this inter-
pretation finds some support in a cryptic footnote in Justice Black-
mun's majority opinion, 159 the narrow construction of the Kodak's
sweeping language seems strained.
One of the striking features of this line of cases is the apparent
willingness of courts that follow it to put aside actual evidence of
anticompetitive effects in favor of ard deductive logic. The syllo-
gism that is applied is roughly as follows: (1) buyers will know of the
terms of sale of aftermarket products at the time of purchase of the
installed-base product; (2) if the aftermarket terms are unfavorable,
the buyer will adjust its purchase decision; therefore, (3) if the seller
made no change in the terms of aftermarket products' availability af-
ter the sale of its installed-base product, there can be no anticompeti-
tive effect from the use of a tie-in on the aftermarket products. There
is no place in this syllogism for disputing the conclusion-actual evi-
dence of anticompetitive effects (the cardinal rule of Kodak) is a pri-
ori disregarded as inconsistent with deductive theory.
157 Id. at 20.
158 See PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997) ("We
likewise agree that the change in policy in Kodak was the crucial factor in the Court's deci-
sion."); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("The Court did not doubt in Kodak that if spare parts had been bundled with
Kodak's copiers from the outset, or Kodak had informed customers about its policies before
they bought its machines, purchasers could have shopped around for competitive life cycle
prices. The material dispute that called for a trial was whether the change in policy enabled
Kodak to extract supra-competitive prices from customers who had already purchased its ma-
chines."). A number of district courts have followed this interpretation. See, e.g., Metzler v.
Bear Auto. Serv. Equip. Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (noting Kodak's em-
phasis on a change in company policy allowing an antitrust defendant to extract supracompeti-
tive prices); Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 984 F. Supp. 450,459 (E.D. La. 1997) (same).
159 In the footnote, Justice Blackmun wrote that the dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion based on the dissent's "hypothetical case of a tie between equipment and service.
'The only thing lacking' to bring this case within the hypothetical case, states the dissent, 'is
concrete evidence that the restrictive parts policy.., was generally known.' But the dissent's
'only thing lacking' is the crucial thing lacking-evidence." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,477 n.24 (1992).
Commenting on the heavy reliance that some circuits have placed on this footnote, one
district judge wrote:
This enigmatic comment, designed as a brisk rejoinder, is too slender a reed on which to
base a significant restriction on the Court's holding particularly when in its very next sen-
tence, the [Kodak] majority emphasizes that liability "depends on whether the equipment
market prevents the exertion of market power in the [aftermarket]."
Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 n. 11 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
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The premises that lead to the conclusion of no anticompetitive
effect are highly vulnerable. As one district judge (who declined to
follow the change of policy construction) put it:
It is noteworthy that in the [Kodak] Court's lengthy discus-
sion of information costs it never once makes reference to
Kodak's change in policy. Information costs may be high,
and a manufacturer may thus have considerable market
power in the aftermarket, even in the absence of a change in
policy. As the [Kodak] Court pointed out, "even if consum-
ers were capable of acquiring the complex body of [life cycle
pricing] information, they may choose not to do so. Acquir-
ing information is expensive. If the costs of service are small
relative to the equipment price, or if consumers are more
concerned about equipment capabilities than service costs,
they may not find it cost efficient to compile the informa-
tion.' 1
60
Despite its vulnerability, the "change in policy" construction of
Kodak is likely to resonate with those who believe that antitrust
should give way to freedom of contract, even in the face of clear evi-
dence of anticompetitive effects. In its broadest application, the
change of policy interpretation may swallow Kodak entirely. Con-
sider a franchisor who writes boilerplate language into every fran-
chise contract that entitles it to change, without prior notice, the terms
and conditions of purchase for all input products required by the fran-
chisee. Under Judge Easterbrook's interpretation in Digital Equip-
ment Corp., such blanket notice would be sufficient to avoid follow-
ing Kodak.161  But such generic notice of a franchsior's right to
change policies, even if it is read and digested 'by prospective franchi-
sees, will be next to useless because of the inability to predict what
procurement policies might be instituted by the franchisor years after
the original franchise agreement was signed. 162
Notwithstanding its flawed underpinnings, the change of policy
interpretation of Kodak seems entrenched in a number of circuits.
"0 Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citation omitted).
161 This appears to be precisely what happened in Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 984 F. Supp.
450, 461 (E.D. La. 1997) (finding that franchisees had sufficient information to conclude that
they would be required to purchase from a single supplier indefinitely).
162 In Penna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the Supreme
Court was unimpressed with arguments that the franchisees' act of signing boilerplate language
in the franchise contract precluded any antitrust recovery. Justice Black reasoned that the fran-
chisees "apparently accepted many of these restraints solely because their acquiescence was
necessary to obtain an otherwise attractive business opportunity." Id. at 139.
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Assuming the Supreme Court does not address this issue, the only
uncertainty in circuits that follow this interpretation may be how far
the interpretation is extended. In these circuits, there may still be
room for plaintiffs to prevail on a Kodak theory if the defendant has
effected a clear change in policy after the installed-base product is
sold. In franchise cases, a related unsettled issue is whether a franchi-
sor can wholly avoid Kodak liability by including broad boilerplate
language in the franchise agreement that allows the franchisor to
make unrestricted changes in requirements concerning input products
that the franchisee must purchase.
(b) Intellectual Property Defenses
A second rationale for not applying Kodak is that its application
might result in antitrust liability in contravention of intellectual prop-
erty rights. Kodak pressed its patent rights arguments on remand, but
the Ninth Circuit found these arguments "pretextual. 1 63  Intellectual
property rights were decisive, however, in In re Independent Service
Organizations Antitrust Litigation.164 The plaintiff, an independent
service provider that had serviced Xerox original equipment, brought
Sherman Act claims against Xerox for its refusal to sell patented parts
and copyrighted manuals and to license copyrighted software. In af-
firming summary judgment for Xerox, the Federal Circuit declined to
apply Kodak because the case involved a tying claim that had not
been made against Xerox. 165 The court also interpreted broadly a pat-
entee's right to refuse to license or sell, even when that refusal could
result in substantial anticompetitive effects in a secondary market. 
166
The Xerox decision suggests a substantial curtailment not only of Ko-
dak theories, but also of the reach of antitrust generally.
163 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th
Cir. 1997).
164 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
'6' See id. at 1327.
166 In his critique of the Xerox decision, then FTC Chairman Pitofsky wrote:
In effect, the Federal Circuit has leaped from the undeniable premise that an intel-
lectual property holder does not have to license anyone in the first instance to the
unjustifiable conclusions that it can select among licensees to achieve an anti-
competitive purpose or can condition a license (for example, you receive a license
only if you agree not to do business with my competitor) to achieve an anti-
competitive effect.
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the
Heart of the New Economy, at http'//www.ftc.gov/gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf3Ol.htm. (Mar. 2,
2001). For a recent decision that suggests that intellectual property rights will not broadly dis-
place antitrust claims, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(stating, in response to a sweeping claim that lawfully acquired intellectual property rights con-
ferred antitrust immunity: "That is no more correct than the proposition that use of one's per-
sonal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.").
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(c) Kodak Misunderstood
Finally, there have been cases in which courts refuse to follow
Kodak because they have apparently misunderstood the holding. In
Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,167 a split panel declined to
apply Kodak to Sherman Act claims that a franchisor had unlawfully
required franchisees to purchase pizza dough only from the franchi-
sor. At one point, the majority appeared to embrace a market defini-
tion of all investment opportunities available to a potential franchisee
at the time the franchise contract was signed. 168 Earlier in the opin-
ion, however, the majority declared the relevant market to be "com-
modities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same pur-
poses."'169 Pizza dough was available to consumers from a wide vari-
ety of sources other than the Domino's chain, so such a market defini-
tion was fatal to plaintiffs. But the definition had nothing to do with
the franchisor's power to coerce franchisees into purchases of over-
priced or inferior quality pizza dough, Kodak was all about the Su-
preme Court's willingness to consider market power abuses in a sin-
gle brand market, a circumstance not squarely addressed by the
Queen City court.
This confusing discussion of relevant market highlights the im-
portance of not rotely invoking market definitions to the exclusion of
evidence of anticompetitive effects. In Queen City, the franchisee
plaintiffs had offered evidence of the availability of comparable or
superior pizza dough, produced by one of Domino's own franchisees,
at a lower price.170 To ignore this evidence is to depart from Kodak's
central admonition that antitrust is about actual market effects, not
"legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions."'
171
CONCLUSION
Kodak is a multi-faceted decision that turns out to have unique
relevance for addressing the systemic bias against small business.
The full extent of that bias, and why it is harmful to competition, re-
mains to be forthrightly acknowledged and addressed by the antitrust
community. That will be no mean task. But if competition works
better, and the consumer is better served, when small businesses are
167 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997).
'6' See id. at 441.
1 Id. at 438. The dissent argued that the majority had not properly applied Kodak See
id. at 444 (Lay, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit denied plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en
banc, but the denial was accompanied by an unusual written dissent. See id at 725-26 (Becker,
J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
170 See id. at 434.
171 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,466 (1992).
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given a fair and non-discriminatory opportunity to compete, then anti-
trust must join the battle or forsake its most fundamental precepts.
Once the issue is acknowledged, Kodak's call for empirical hon-
esty in assessing real market effects offers the starting point for a
comprehensive response. Each of the many judicial rules and screen-
ing doctrines developed with the best of intent to cull out non-
meritorious antitrust claims should be put to this test: Does the rule,
when applied, shield abusive strategic conduct that targets small
business or other non-power players? If the answer is yes, then the
rule itself, or the extent of its application, should be reconsidered.
Kodak's corollary themes are also central to a coordinated re-
sponse to the marketplace bias against small business. In particular,
Kodak speaks to two pivotal issues involving seller power abuses
such as tie-ins: (1) the recognition that information deficiencies and
sunk investments can create a coercive relational power that victim-
izes small players and distorts competition and (2) the demonstration
that leverage theory is often an accurate description of the anticom-
petitive effects that arise from strategic use of a tie-in to target small
businesses and other non-power players.
Of course, Kodak has a legacy independent of the concern with
marketplace bias against small business. As the tenth anniversary of
Kodak nears, it is an opportune time to consider that legacy. Will it
face a fate similar to United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,172 over-
ruled by the Court on its tenth anniversary? Will it survive as an
emaciated precedent largely ignored and readily distinguished by fed-
eral courts? Or will its teachings about empiricism, informational
problenm, relational market power, and summary judgment guide the
future evolution of antitrust theory and practice?
While no one can predict with assurance Kodak's life cycle in
the courts, current trends suggest that Kodak will continue to be dis-
tinguished or simply ignored by courts that do not wish to follow it.
But the ideas and issues raised in Kodak cannot and will not disap-
pear, even if the case were expressly overruled. The Court's vision-
ary insights in June of 1992 were a restatement in modern application
of concepts that have resonated through a century of antitrust. They
will not disappear.
172 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn was overruled by the Court in Continental TV., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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